Chapter 2-revisited

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Chapter two, part one

In this part Trotsky analyses development of first years after the revolution, the period between 1918 and 1927 which was characterised by economic and political crises with reviving of capitalist elements.

The period of war communism which was accompanyed with big economic fall was oriented to supporting war industries to protect the soviet state and keep the working class in cities alive. As Trotsky says: "Military communism was, in essence, the systematic regimentation of consumption in a besieged fortress."

Trotsky also makes clear that war communism originally pursued broader aims, bolsheviks thought that with it they could replace trade by planned state distribution of products, which would bring society to its communist stage after some time. But because of material shortages and delay of socialist revolution in developed west it miserably failed, but was on the other hand the only way for protecting ruined soviet state in the war time.

However, Trotsky say: "It can be said with certainty, however, that even in that happy event [socialist revolution in developed west, notably Germany - my remark] it would still have been necessary to renounce the direct state distribution of products in favor of the methods of commerce." If we looked at that statement today, we could see that nowadays it would be posible to achieve that with application of modern information systems, which are already being used by multiantional companies and monopols in modern capitalism. It would still require some time to create such universal information system in which people could democratically participate tho´.

The market came back into being with the NEP, with which war communism was destroyed. NEP had to be introduced, because of badly developed productive forces at the time and because population mainly consisted of peasent population, having small plots of land based on petty-bourgeois production.

With NEP, economy started to improove and by 1926 production had already achieved the pre-war level. In 1923 disagreements in the bolshevik party started to show themselve. The country had to borrow grain and materials from peasants in order to survive, grow and develop. However, not the whole party agreed on the question how much should be "forcedly borrowed" from peasants.

At the time it was conflict between the Opposition (Trotsky), and the rulling faction. NEP inevitably created, in short space of time, exploiters who were buying labour power and other parasites and speculators. All conditions and state laws were working mainly in favour of the kulaks and not the poor peasants. Kulaks could buy labour power and rent land. Soviet Union was forced into retreating in favour of rural petty bougeois and petty home craftsmen. Bukharin also had his famous slogan for kulaks: "Get rich!" By some strange theory kulaks should grow into socialism. We can only wonder what kind of magic would be needed for something of the like to happen.

The rulling faction didn´t abolish plans for nationalization, but only postponed them, they said that collectivization was not possible at the time, maybe not even in next decade. Left Opposition was, on the other hand, saying that collectivization must take place now and through example by helping poor peasants organized in collectives and transform them later in collectivized production. But this programme was never adopted, and Left oposition was expelled in 1927 on the 15th Party Congress.

Beside the kulak disagreement, there was also disagreement about planned industrialization, because oppositionists were calling for higher taxation of kulaks and speeding up of industrial development. Opositionists were called for this "mistaken theory", "super-industrialists" and the rulling clique ridiculed the idea of accelerated industrial growth with childish phrases like "a leap into the unknown", "fantastic plans", meanwhile "Stalin asserted at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee that to attempt to build the Dnieperstroy hydro-electric station would be the same thing for us as for a muzhik to buy a gramophone instead of a cow."

The programme of the Opposition was of course not implemented in practice. Trotsky shows that first five year plan was limited only to 16 percent of national income, while tsarist Russia wasted 18 percent of national income and had no plans for building socialist society. Later on State Planning Commission drew up a third five year plan, which implemented opposition´s programme of industrialization, but still very far from what the opposition was arguing for.

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Chapter two, part two

This part is concentrated on the zig zags of Stalinist clique which moved from position of "a peaceful tempo in economic development" and "growing of kulaks into socialism" to five year plans in four years and complete collectiviaztion.

Trotsky shows how mistaken Stalinist clique was. It didn´t grasp that kulaks were not "selling grain to socialist state" because they felt some inner affiliation to building of socialism, but because they wanted to make profit. When they couldn´t get enough profits from selling grain to the state, they refused to sell it and hid it, which created famine in cities. This famine happened in January 1928. In July 1928 Stalin was for example still claiming: "There are people who think that individual farms have exhausted their usefulness, that we should not support them.... These people have nothing in common with the line of our party."

Right opposition was being accused of all kinds of charges, meanwhile slogans "Get rich!" and "kulaks growing painlessly into socialism" were abandoned and condemned. At the same time Stalinist bureaucracy abandoned theory of "tortoise tempo" (regarding industrial development of the country), put forward the idead of cathing up the west in shortest possible time and prepared the "five year plan carried out in four years", which adopted 20 to 30 percent yearly growth. Measures adopted by Stalinist cliques totally destroyed firm basis of the currency system.

The gravest danger which was coming from the kulaks and rich peasants in general was not eliminated tho´. In february 1928 the bureaucracy suddenly found out that kulaks actually exist, which was denied till that time. They found out that kulaks sabotaged soviet economy, that they possesed complicated machinery, employed hired labour, that they were concealing grains etc..

To solve the famine problem, kulaks had to be dispossessed of their grain by force. The bureaucracy said that after the expropriation of grain, the problem of grain and agriculture would be solved once and for all. But that wasn´t so, because rich peasants lost the motive to increase sowings just to be deprived of it later, equally labour force, which kulaks employed, found itself without work. The problem was not solved at all, it just expressed itself in different way.

Stalinist bureaucracy still supported individual farming at the time of dispossessing of rich peasants´ grain, but gradually came to position that collective farms should be promoted to solve the grain and agricultural problem in general. But there was no time for gradual introduction of collective farms through example and financial support. The train already left the station. Because of that it was necessary to collectivize as soon as possible and Stalin came from his position in July 1928 (mentioned above) to "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" and "end of individual farming".

Trotsky shows that the main problem of the fast collectivization was not merely the use of force, which was used, but the bad economic base, badly developed productive forces. Small farms which entered collectives had, in most cases, machinery only suitable for small-scale farming, but collective farms needed machines for large-scale farming. Because of the collectivization in hurry, the state did not and could not furnish collective farms with needed machinery. This was also due to the fact that before the collectivization in hurry, fast industrial development was put asside and ridiculed by the gramophone phrase. Collectivization was obviously an act of despair, there was no other solution, but when there were solutions before (to some extent at least), the bureaucracy could not see anything further from its own nose, it could not predict anything, anything they did, they were forced into by events. If after the NEP industrial development would have been implemented in greater extent with gradual introduction of collective farms, bad effects of collectivization could had been at least reduced if not liquidated.

The problem of food and raw material shortages were not solved at all. Workers migrated to countryside, carelessness of work was predominant, etc. Problems in fact increased and new measures had to be implemented, like passports for migration from city to city etc. It seemed like war communism during the civil war in new form. Equally, five year plan in four years was not carried out as it should be. But the regime survived, there was no armed foreign intervention or new civil war with rebbelions on behalf of the peasant masses.

With these zig zags and mistakes of the leadership it was shown that in a country based on planned economy, the leadership, its tactics and ideas are of very big importance. As Trotsky says: "There is no other government in the world in whose hands the fate of the whole country is concentrated to such a degree. The successes and failures of an individual capitalist depend, not wholly of course, but to a very considerable and sometimes decisive degree, upon his personal qualities. Mutatis mutandis, the Soviet government occupies in relation to the whole economic system the position which a capitalist occupies in relation to a single enterprise. The centralized character of the national economy converts the state power into a factor of enormous significance. But for that very reason the policy of the government must be judged, not by summarized results, not by naked statistical data, but by the specific role which conscious foresight and planned leadership have played in achieving these results."

The failures were not caused mainly by objective conditions, but also by inadequate ability of the leaders to understand objective material situation on one hand, and to analyse it correctly on the other. This caused a big sabotage and waste to soviet economy. Trotsky here also poses questions for further investigation:

-"how and why a faction the least rich of all in ideas, and the most burdened with mistakes, should have gained the upper hand over all other groups, and concentrated an unlimited power in its hands."

-"Is socialism really achieved in the Soviet Union?"

-"Do the present economic and cultural achievements constitute a guarantee against the danger of capitalist restoration—just as bourgeois society at a certain stage of its development became insured by its own successes against a restoration of serfdom and feudalism?"