Dialectical Materialism

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

May I respectfully suggest you get off the fence?

[Paula Marx]

May I respectfully suggest you get off the fence?

No, but I don't see why would you do it anyway.

[Volkov]

You can get some basics on dialectical materialism at http://www.marxist.com/what-is-dialectical-materialism.htm

Sorry for simply posting a hyperlink; I am rather busy as of late.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Volkov:

You can get some basics on dialectical materialism

And which makes all the usual mistakes.

These are outlined here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

and in more detail, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

[CyM]

Rosa's still on her mystical babble that every problem in the universe can be reduced to the evil dialectical materialists. Ignore her.

Volkov's link is a good one, but if you're looking for something shorter, I would recommend this article by Trotsky:

The ABC of
Materialist Dialectics

Dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics.

I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concrete form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality ‘A’ is not equal to ‘A’. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens—they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar—a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true—all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself “at any given moment”.

Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this “axiom”, it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we really conceive the word “moment”? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that “moment” to inevitable changes. Or is the “moment” a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’ signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist.

At first glance it could seem that these “subtleties” are useless. In reality they are of decisive significance. The axiom ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’ appears on one hand to be the point of departure for all our knowledge, on the other hand the point of departure for all the errors in our knowledge. To make use of the axiom of ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’ with impunity is possible only within certain limits. When quantitative changes in ‘A’ are negligible for the task at hand then we can presume that ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’. This is, for example, the manner in which a buyer and a seller consider a pound of sugar. We consider the temperature of the sun likewise. Until recently we consider the buying power of the dollar in the same way. But quantitative changes beyond certain limits become converted into qualitative. A pound of sugar subjected to the action of water or kerosene ceases to be a pound of sugar. A dollar in the embrace of a president ceases to be a dollar. To determine at the right moment the critical point where quantity changes into quality is one of the most important and difficult tasks in all the spheres of knowledge including sociology.

Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of baring-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits (this is called tolerance). By observing the norms of tolerance, the cones are considered as being equal. (‘A’ is equal to ‘A’). When the tolerance is exceeded the quantity goes over into quality; in other words, the cone bearings become inferior or completely worthless.

Our scientific thinking is only a part of our general practice including techniques. For concepts there also exits “tolerance” which is established not by formal logic issuing from the axiom ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’, but by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing. “Common sense” is characterised by the fact that it systematically exceeds dialectical “tolerance”.

Vulgar thought operates with such concepts as capitalism, morals, freedom, workers’ state, etc as fixed abstractions, presuming that capitalism is equal to capitalism. Morals are equal to morals, etc. Dialectical thinking analyses all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which ‘A’ ceases to be ‘A’, a workers’ state ceases to be a workers’ state.

The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of a reality which consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of closer approximations, corrections, concretisation, a richness of content and flexibility; I would even say “a succulence” which to a certain extent brings them closer to living phenomena. Not capitalism in general, but a given capitalism at a given stage of development. Not a workers’ state in general, but a given workers’ state in a backward country in an imperialist encirclement, etc.

Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion. Dialectics does not deny the syllogism, but teaches us to combine syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the eternally changing reality. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradictions, conflict of content and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc., which are just as important for theoretical thought as is the simple syllogism for more elementary tasks.

Hegel wrote before Darwin and before Marx. Thanks to the powerful impulse given to thought by the French Revolution, Hegel anticipated the general movement of science. But because it was only an anticipation, although by a genius, it received from Hegel an idealistic character. Hegel operated with ideological shadows as the ultimate reality. Marx demonstrated that the movement of these ideological shadows reflected nothing but the movement of material bodies.

We call our dialectic materialist, since its roots are neither in heaven nor in the depths of our “free will”, but in objective reality, in nature. Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, the solar system out of the nebulae. On all the rungs of this ladder of development, the quantitative changes were transformed into qualitative. Our thought, including dialectical thought, is only one of the forms of the expression of changing matter. There is place within this system for neither God nor Devil, nor immortal soul, nor eternal norms of laws and morals. The dialectic of thinking, having grown out of the dialectic of nature, possess consequently a thoroughly materialist character.

Darwinism, which explained the evolution of species through quantitative transformations passing into qualitative, was the highest triumph of the dialectic in the whole field of organic matter. Another great triumph was the discovery of the table of atomic weights of chemical elements and further the transformation of one element into another.

With these transformations (species, elements, etc.) is closely linked the question of classification, equally important in the natural as in the social sciences. Linnaeus’ system (18th century), utilising as its starting point the immutability of species, was limited to the description and classification of plants according to their external characteristics. The infantile period of botany is analogous to the infantile period of logic, since the forms of our thought develop like everything that lives. Only decisive repudiation of the idea of fixed species, only the study of the history of the evolution of plants and their anatomy prepared the basis for a really scientific classification.

Marx, who in distinction from Darwin was a conscious dialectician, discovered a basis for the scientific classification of human societies in the development of their productive forces and the structure of the relations of ownership which constitute the anatomy of society. Marxism substituted for the vulgar descriptive classification of societies and states, which even up to now still flourishes in the universities, a materialistic dialectical classification. Only through using the method of Marx is it possible correctly to determine both the concept of a workers’ state and the moment of its downfall.

All this, as we see, contains nothing “metaphysical” or “scholastic”, as conceited ignorance affirms. Dialectic logic expresses the laws of motion in contemporary scientific thought. The struggle against materialist dialectics on the contrary expresses a distant past, conservatism of the petit-bourgeoisie, the self-conceit of university routinists and ... a spark of hope for an after-life.

The Nature of the USSR

The definition of the USSR given by comrade Burnham, “not a workers’ and not a bourgeois state”, is purely negative, wrenched from the chain of historical development, left dangling in mid-air, void of a single particle of sociology and represents simply a theoretical capitulation of pragmatism before a contradictory historical phenomenon.

If Burnham were a dialectical materialist, he would have probed the following three questions: (1) What was the historical origin of the USSR? (2) What changes has this state suffered during its existence? (3) Did these changes pass from the quantitative stage to the qualitative? That is, did they create a historically necessary domination by a new exploiting class? Answering these questions would have forced Burnham to draw the only possible conclusion the USSR is still a degenerated workers’ state.

The dialectic is not a magic master key for all questions. It does not replace concrete scientific analysis. But it directs this analysis along the correct road, securing it against sterile wanderings in the desert of subjectivism and scholasticism.

Bruno R. places both the Soviet and fascist regimes under the category of “bureaucratic collectivism”, because the USSR, Italy and Germany are all ruled by bureaucracies; here and there are the principles of planning; in one case private property is liquidated, in another limited, etc. Thus on the basis of the relative similarity of certain external characteristics of different origin, of different specific weight, of different class significance, a fundamental identity of social regimes is constructed, completely in the spirit of bourgeois professors who construct, categories of “controlled economy”, “centralised state”, without taking into consideration whatsoever the class nature of one or the other, Bruno R. and his followers, or semi-followers like Burnham, at best remain in the sphere of social classification on the level of Linnaeus in whose justification it should be remarked however that he lived before Hegel, Darwin and Marx.

Even worse and more dangerous, perhaps, are those eclectics who express the idea that the class character of the Soviet state “does not matter”, and that the direction of our policy is determined by the “character of the war”. As if the war were an independent super-social substance; as if the character of the war were not determined by the character of the ruling class, that is, by the same social factor that also determines the character of the state. Astonishing how easily some comrades forget the ABCs of Marxism under the blows of events!

It is not surprising that the theoreticians of the opposition who reject dialectic thought capitulate lamentably before the contradictory nature of the USSR. However the contradiction between the social basis laid down by the revolution, and the character of the caste which arose out of the degeneration of the revolution is not only an irrefutable historical fact but also a motor force. In our struggle for the overthrow of the bureaucracy we base ourselves on this contradiction. Meanwhile some ultra-lefts have already reached the ultimate absurdity by affirming that it is necessary to sacrifice the social structure of the USSR in order to overthrow the Bonapartist oligarchy! They have no suspicion that the USSR minus the social structure founded by the October Revolution would be a fascist regime.

Evolution and Dialectics

Comrade Burnham will probably protest that as an evolutionist he is interested in the development of society and state forms not less than we dialecticians. We will not dispute this. Every educated person since Darwin has labelled themself an “evolutionist”. But a real evolutionist must apply the idea of evolution to his own forms of thinking. Elementary logic founded in the period when the idea of evolution itself did not yet exist, is evidently insufficient for the analysis of evolutionary processes. Hegel’s logic is the logic of evolution. Only one must not forget that the concept of “evolution” itself has been completely corrupted and emasculated by university and liberal writers to mean peaceful “progress”. Whoever has come to understand that evolution process through the struggle of antagonistic forces; that a slow accumulation of changes at a certain moment explodes the old shell and brings about a catastrophe, revolution; whoever has learned finally to apply the general laws of evolution to thinking itself, he is a dialectician, as distinguished from vulgar evolutionists. Dialectic training of the mind, as necessary to a revolutionary fighter as finger exercises to a pianist, demands approaching all problems as processes and not as motionless categories. Whereas vulgar evolutionists, who limit themselves generally to recognising evolution in only certain spheres, content themselves in all other questions with the banalities of “common sense”.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CYM, still incapable of responding to my demolition of this 'theory':

Rosa's still on her mystical babble that every problem in the universe can be reduced to the evil dialectical materialists. Ignore her.

Good job Engels didn't adopt this strategy with respect to Dühring, or Trotsky with Burnham, eh?

Volkov's link is a good one, but if you're looking for something shorter, I would recommend this article by Trotsky:

Unfortunately, Trotsky makes all the usual mistakes, and few new ones of his own.

Here are a few [DM = Dialectical Materialism/Dialectical Materialist, according to context]:

In his debate with Burnham, Trotsky rehearsed an argument that was aimed at exposing what he took to be serious limitations of the LOI [Law of Identity], which he had lifted directly or indirectly from Hegel and which has resurfaced almost verbatim in the writings of other DM-theorists who claim to be Trotskyists. The motivation for Trotsky's analysis was his belief that FL [Formal Logic] deals only with static and lifeless concepts, rendering it incapable of grasping the dynamism found in concrete reality. [In fact, Aristotle does not mention the LOI (he does however pass scathing remarks on the use of identity), and it is quite easy to show that his logic is more than capable of handling change -- see below.]

Remarkably, Trotsky nowhere attempted to substantiate these sweeping allegations; in fact there is no evidence that he consulted a single logic text written in the last 200 years. Clearly, he did not think that this disqualified him from passing opinion on the subject. By the same token therefore we may suppose him an expert in High Energy Physics and brain surgery.

This damning criticism applies equally to most of Trotsky's epigones –- to say nothing of DM-theorists in general --, few of whom show any sign of ever having consulted a single logic text (ancient or modern), saving, of course, those two badly misnamed books written by Hegel.


For example, we find Trotsky (who was otherwise reasonably up-to-date in his knowledge of the sciences) writing the following in his "Open Letter to Burnham" -- approximately 60 years after MFL was initiated by Frege, and approximately 30 years after Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica was first published:

"I know of two systems of logic worthy of attention: the logic of Aristotle (formal logic) and the logic of Hegel (the dialectic). Aristotelian logic takes as its starting point immutable objects and phenomena…. [P]lease take the trouble to inform us just who following Aristotle analysed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic." [Trotsky (1971), pp.91-92.]

To which Burnham not unreasonably replied:

"[A]part from Aristotle, the only 'logic worthy of attention' is that of -- Hegel…. Comrade Trotsky, as we Americans ask: where have you been all these years? During the 125 years since Hegel wrote…[,] after 2300 years of stability, logic has undergone a revolutionary transformation…in which Hegel and his ideas have had an influence of exactly zero….

"In a most sarcastic vein, you keep asking me to 'take the trouble to inform us just who following Aristotle analysed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic'…as if this demand were so obviously impossible of fulfilment that I must collapse like a pricked balloon before it…. Do you wish me to prepare a reading list, Comrade Trotsky? It would be long, ranging from the work of the brilliant mathematicians and logicians of the middle of the last century to…the monumental 'Principia Mathematica' of Russell and Whitehead…." [Burnham (1971), pp.236-37.]

Unfortunately, wilful ignorance like this among dialecticians has not noticeably changed much since Trotsky's day. Hence, we still find socialists of otherwise impeccable dialectical credentials repeating Trotsky's ill-informed opinions time and again, still confusing FL with AFL [Aristotelian Formal Logic], still clinging to the dogma that Aristotle is and always will be the last (and only) word on the subject.

Worse still, far too many Marxists compound this inexcusable ignorance with an open failure to grasp even the few degenerate logical ideas they mistakenly attribute to Aristotle.

Far from it being the case that FL is wedded to changeless forms, even traditional AFL employed variables to stand for propositions and predicates (general terms) long before they appeared in mathematics. This fact alone shows that traditional AFL was no more incapable of handling change than is modern Mathematics.

As Engels himself pointed out, the introduction of variables into Algebra allowed mathematicians to cope with change. If that is so, it is difficult to understand why DM-theorists believe that traditional FL cannot cope with change, too. If mathematicians are currently able to depict change by their use of variables, why deny this capacity of traditional formal logicians who used the very same device 2400 years ago?

To illustrate the absurdity of the idea that just because FL uses certain words or letters it cannot handle change (and uses nothing but rigid terms), consider this parallel argument:

(1) If x = 2 and f(x) = 2x + 1, then if y = f(x), y = 5.

(2) Therefore x and y can never change or become any other numbers.

No one would be foolish enough to argue this way in mathematics, for that would be to confuse variables with constants. But, if this is so in mathematics, then DM-inspired claims about the alleged limitations of FL seem all the more bizarre -- to say the least.

Now, it's rare to find a dialectician who fails to say the following:

"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [Rob Sewell.]

"It is necessary to acquire a concrete understanding of the object as an integral system, not as isolated fragments; with all its necessary interconnections, not torn out of context, like a butterfly pinned to a collector's board; in its life and movement, not as something lifeless and static. Such an approach is in open conflict with the so-called 'laws' of formal logic, the most absolute expression of dogmatic thought ever conceived, representing a kind of mental rigor mortis. But nature lives and breathes, and stubbornly resists the embraces of formalistic thinking. 'A' is not equal to 'A.' Subatomic particles are and are not. Linear processes end in chaos. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Quantity changes into quality. Evolution itself is not a gradual process, but interrupted by sudden leaps and catastrophes. What can we do about it? Facts are stubborn things." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.82-83.]

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

Once again, the bemused reader will search long and hard, and to no avail, to find a reference to a single logic text (in the writings of dialecticians) that supports these contentions.

Nevertheless, a few counterexamples to the claim that FL cannot cope with change should at least give neutral observers pause for thought (though not dialecticians, who ignore awkward details like these, and continue to make the same baseless assertions about FL and change whatever facts are lobbed in their general direction).

In the following examples, I have kept the arguments very simple (this is a summary, after all!):

Argument One:

Premiss One: All dialecticians are human beings.

Premiss Two: All human beings age.

Conclusion: All dialecticians age.

Argument Two:

Premiss One: All dialecticians believe Formal Logic cannot cope with change.

Conclusion: The refutation of a dialectician is the refutation of someone who believes Formal Logic cannot cope with change.

[A refutation is a form of change.]

Argument Three:

Premiss One: For all objects/processes x, for some time t, and for some time t' (where t'>t), if Fx(t) and ¬Fx(t'), then x has changed.

Premiss Two:  Fa(t) and ¬Fa(t'),

Conclusion: a has changed.

Of course, if other areas of modern FL are introduced (such as Modal and Temporal Logic -- subjects which most dialecticians have never even heard of!), then it will become possible to account for more complex and protracted forms of change.

All this is thrown into stark relief by the fact that it is possible to show that dialectical materialism [DM] itself cannot cope with change, or, alternatively, that if DM were true, change would be impossible. Comrades can find that argument set out in detail at RevLeft:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

More details, references and argument can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

But, what about this argument?

I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concrete form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality ‘A’ is not equal to ‘A’. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens—they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar—a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true—all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves.

Here is my response to the above argument:

Now, the 'definition' Trotsky uses (viz., "A is equal to A" ) -- one reproduced identically by his followers [irony intended!] -- is in fact an example of the principle of equality, not of identity.

Some might want to argue that this is unfair since the principle of equality is in fact the same as the principle of identity, but if that is so, then plainly at least two items (namely these) obey the LOI [Law of Identity], and Trotsky was wrong. On the other hand, if they are not identical, then Trotsky attacked the wrong target, after all!

It could be objected that these two principles are approximately identical, so much so that the difference between them can be ignored. However, as we will see, this is not even remotely correct; these two concepts/words are totally different. But, even if it were the case that they were approximately identical, that would be no help. Unless we had a clear idea what would count as absolute identity between these two, we would be in no position to declare they are only approximately identical. An approximation only makes sense if we know with what it is that it approximates, and for us to know that, we would have to know how the LOI applies absolutely to these two, to be able to say why this is a mere approximation.

It could be argued that the above is just an example of abstract identity, which dialecticians do not query, they merely wish to point out the limitations of LOI applied to changing reality. But, the passage above is expressed in very material ink (or are represented by very material pixels), so they are not abstract. On the other hand, if they are still to be rejected as abstract then Trotsky's point about the letter "A"s to which he refers cannot stand, for they are equally material.

As noted above, identity and equality are relatively easy to distinguish (such that even the children of workers can tell them apart). For example, in elementary mathematics the equation 2x + 1 = 7 is true if and only if x = 3, but no one supposes that x is identical to 3, otherwise it could never equal any other number (as it does in, say, 3x – 2 = 19).

In contrast, the "<->" sign [I'd much prefer to use the more normal three-barred identity sign here, but the formatting at this site disallows it] which appears in, say, 2sinxcosx <-> sin2x expresses identity, for this rule yields the true for all defined values of x.

Worse still: two or more identicals can be equal to, but different from the same identical. For instance, even though 0 = 0, it is also true that 0 + 0 = 0, and 0 x 0 = 0 -- even though it is also true that neither 0 + 0 nor 0 x 0 are identical to 0.

In MFL [Modern Formal Logic] (i.e., outside of mathematics), the distinction between these two is even more pronounced. The "=" sign  is used as a relational expression (and can be flanked only by names (or other singular terms)), whereas "<->" and is a truth-functional operator (and can be flanked only by propositions, and the like).

[A truth-functional operator is a device which maps a linguistic expression onto either truth or falsehood, for example:

"...is a bourgeois politician" maps "Obama" onto True, but "Alan Woods" onto False.]

Furthermore, in ordinary material language the difference between equality and identity is even clearer. So, we can say things like "The author of What is To Be Done? is identical with Lenin" (whereas, it would be decidedly odd to say "The author of What is To Be Done? is equal to Lenin"), just as we can say that "The number of authors of What is To Be Done? is equal to one" (but not, "The number of authors of What is To Be Done? is identical to one"). And, since counting objects is just as material a practice as weighing them, no dialectician can consistently take exception to these and other such awkward material examples of the difference between identity and equality, while accepting uncritically Trotsky's point about weighing bags of sugar.

Not only that, two things can be equal even while they fail to be identical, and vice versa. For example, two distinct comrades could be equal first in two separate lists and/or queues. Now, the material embodiment of such facts could alter either greatly (or hardly at all) without affecting their status. So, for example, the names of the said comrades could be written in neon signs that flashed on and off every second, and out of sequence -- or, one could do handstands while the other reads a book --, but they would still both be equal first in their queues, and non-identical for all that.

And some things can be equal and identical, or not, as the case may be. For example, the letter "T" can occur identically in first place in two different words (such as "Trotsky" and "teamster") even though neither letter nor word is equal or identical in size or shape. And, two letters, which are identically first in the alphabet (namely two "A"s) can be non-identically positioned in two unequal words (such as "target" and "Antarctic"). Indeed, careful optical examination will fail to show that those two "T"s are not identically-positioned at the front of the two quoted words (nor that they are not equally first in each), or that the two numerically different "A"s are not identically the opening letter of the alphabet. This sort of identity is clearly not sensitive to empirical test, eyeglass or no. Trotsky failed to notice this.

And we needn't concentrate on examples that some might still consider "abstract"; two physical ink marks on a page (two letter "A"'s, say) which are not identical in shape or size (i.e., "a" and "A") could be identically positioned between other non-identical letters. So, in "pat" and "PAT" each letter "A" is identically sandwiched between two other non-identical letters. Now the physical position of material ink marks on a page, or even that of these electronically produced pixels on your screen, is not abstract, it is eminently material --, so much so that one or both can be obliterated by the non-dialectical application either of Tippex or the delete key.

This non-dialectical deletion would not be removing an abstraction.

Finally, large or small differences in these letters, and any other incidental changes they undergo (that do not alter their position) will not affect the fact that they are identically positioned between two other letters.

Ordinary material language is in fact almost limitless in the capacity it allows its users to express sameness, equality, identity and difference if they refuse to be led astray by the obscure jargon employed by Idealist philosophers (like Hegel). [A long list of examples can be supplied on request.] It is a pity that Trotsky's otherwise brilliant mind failed to notice such familiar facts about the vernacular.

Worse still, some things can change even while they stay the same! For example, it is easy to transform 1/√n into √n/n thus: 1/√n x √n/√n = √n/n. But, 1/√n does not even look like √n/n, although the two are identical: 1/√n <-> √n/n. So, here we have change with no change!

[Recall: the signs used here are eminently material. Note also that I am using the "<->" sign mathematically here, not logically.]

Finally, someone might object that despite the above, all these examples are "abstract". But even if that were so, there would still be a clear difference between abstract identity and abstract equality, something Trotsky also failed to notice.

However, from this poor start, Trotsky's 'analysis' deteriorates rapidly. As noted above, neither he nor his epigones quote any of the classical versions of the LOI (for example, that constructed by Leibniz), and the latter seem to be unaware of more recent, technical definitions. Clearly, these major interpretive blunders fatally compromise the claim that DM is a science, let alone a philosophical theory that merits serious attention.

Even if it had have been correctly worded and targeted, Trotsky's attack on the LOI would still backfire. This is because his argument depends on the LOI being true of instants in time so that he can criticise it when it is applied to bags of sugar. Hence, his criticism relies on, say, a bag of sugar being non-self-identical during the same moment in time. But, moments in time are just as capable of being measured as bags of sugar are. In that case, Trotsky cannot consistently use "same moment" while criticising "same weight"; both are legitimate examples of identity (as he interprets it). In that case, Trotsky needs the LOI to be true of instants in time so that he can criticise it as false when it is applied to bags of sugar!

Again, if time can be measured (just as sugar can be weighed), the above objection (of mine to Trotsky's 'analysis') cannot be neutralised by claiming that time and/or temporal moments are "abstractions". Weighing and timing are both material activities, and thus subject to the same constraints over variability.

But, even if they weren't, Trotsky cannot argue that a bag of sugar changes in the same instant, for there could be no such thing (if he were right, since nothing can be the same, according to him) -- unless the LOI can be applied validly to such instants (as abstractions). So, even if moments in time are abstractions, Trotsky would have to be able to refer to the same 'abstract moment'. But then, he has also referred to the same weight; but if he is right that the latter can't ever be ascertained in this world (if no two bags ever weigh the same), then no two moments can be the same either. And if that is so, then Trotsky cannot refer to the "same moment" during which weights may vary --, in which case, his criticism collapses.

Moreover, Trotsky (or one of his epigones) can't use the fall-back option that bags of sugar are the same, yet different (employing the "identity-in-difference" gambit) since Trotsky had already torpedoed that response way below the water-line, declaring that all things are never the same:

"Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is true (sic) -- all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves." [Ibid., p.64. Emphasis added.]

Hence, if objects and processes are never the same, they cannot be "the same, yet different", they can only be "different, yet different". Of course, if it is true that they are "the same, yet different" then it cannot be true that they are never the same. Either way, Trotsky's criticism backfires.

Again, some might complain that the above ignores the fact that dialecticians are not attacking the abstract version of the LOI, merely pointing out that when applied to changing reality, this Law is only approximately true.

However, dialecticians certainly have to use identically the same words/concepts as one another (or as they themselves from day to day) if they want to make this point, and/or communicate with each other. Consider just one example of the difficulties this now creates: any two dialecticians who fancy they have the same idea of "abstract identity" must either accept that a material version of the LOI (if it exists in their central nervous system somewhere, or written on the page, in one of Trotsky's essays, say) applies to their two distinct ideas of "abstract identity" (so that they can confirm they are talking about exactly the same thing), or they must concede that they are talking about two different things, and stop their blather.

[And any response from the DM-community to the effect that the above two both are and are not doing the what is outlined above must suffer the same fate, for any dialectician who says this today must mean exactly the same as any other dialectician who says this today (or as he/she meant it yesterday), or admit they are not talking about the same thing, once more.]

Furthermore, the idea that ordinary identity (or even the misconstrued version of it that Trotsky used) only really approximates to abstract identity (so that no two concrete things in material reality are exactly the same, even if they are approximately (abstractly) identical, or that any one particular thing is only approximately (abstractly) self-identical), is equally misconceived.

We are surely no further forward unless we can be told with what it is that our ordinary terms for identity are supposed to approximate, for if these terms do not approximate to anything specifiable, they must be empty notions.

In order to underline this point, consider an analogy: let us suppose that someone introduced a word into the language -- say "schmidentity" -- but could give no examples of anything in reality that could possibly exhibit "schmidentity". If we were then told that certain things were "approximately schmidentical" (or even "schmidentical only within certain limits") we would still have no clear idea of what this new word meant; if we do not know what "schmidentity" is, we certainly do not know what "approximate schmidentity" is. And calling this new 'concept' "abstract schmidentity", "absolute schmidentity", or even "relative schmidentity" would be equally useless.

In that case, when dialecticians presume to tell us that a word (or set of words) in ordinary material language connected with sameness and identity, which we all know how to use, does not mean what we usually take it to mean, then the onus is on them to tell us what they do mean by their new word (or set of words). Until they do, they might as well be talking about schmidentity.

[And it is little point referring to Hegel's criticisms of the LOI; as I have demonstrated in Essay Eight Part Three (link at the end), he badly misconstrued this 'law', compounding such folly with a series of crass errors over the nature of propositions.]

On the other hand, if DM-apologists can say with what it is that our words for identity do in fact approximate, then they must have a clear idea of abstract identity which cannot itself be subject to Trotsky's criticisms, since their idea of abstract identity must be materially identical to abstract identity itself. On the other hand, if this idea is not identical to abstract identity (or to put this better, if they haven't got a clue what abstract identity is so they are in no position to say that their idea of approximate identity approximates to the right concept), then what they say about identity (ordinary or abstract) can be safely ignored, for it won't be about identity, but about something different.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Furthermore, Trotsky's appeal to the hypothetical weighing of bags of sugar is no less misconceived. Since weighing devices are just as susceptible to change as are bags of sugar, Trotsky had no way of knowing whether the different weights he predicted were genuine effects (because only the weight of the sugar (etc.) alters), or whether they were merely artefacts of changes in the machinery used, the result of a locally variable gravitational field, the changing eyesight of the experimenter, or, indeed, were a consequence a host of other factors.

In fact, this latest objection can only be neutralised if weighing machines, experimenters and the rest of the universe (other than bags of sugar) are all exempted from consideration as changeless beings. Only in such circumstances would it be safe to assume that differing measurements were solely the result of changes in the items being weighed. Short of that, Trotsky could only be 100% confident that subsequently detected differences were always and only the result of changes to the weight of the sugar because of an a priori stipulation to that effect. In that case, Trotsky would have imposed dialectics on nature, contrary to what he elsewhere said should never be done:

"Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233.]

On the other hand, if Trotsky had been faced with someone who claimed that at least two of their results were identical, he could only have responded in one or more of the following ways:

(1) Insisting that this experimenter must have been mistaken.

(2) Pointing out that the machines used were not accurate enough.

(3) Maintaining that his instructions had not been carried out exactly to the letter.

(4) Arguing that identically the same experiments had not been performed each time.

In other words, in the absence of a mistake (and if the same results were recorded on more accurate scales) -- i.e., ruling out (1) and (2) above --, Trotsky would only be able to criticise the above reported experimental verification of the LOI by an appeal to that very same 'law', but now applied to his own instructions! Hence, in order to counter results that would disconfirm his forecast (about varying weights) he would have to argue that only those who followed his instructions identically and to the letter could disprove the LOI!

The irony is thus quite plain: identically performed experiments are required to prove that nothing is identical with anything else -- including experiments!

To be sure, anyone who only roughly followed his instructions (who was perhaps content with a wishy-washy, "approximate-within-certain-limits" dialectical-sort-of-equality) would probably find that many (if not most) of their measurements gave identical results for the weights of bags of sugar, confirming this 'law'!

In which case, Trotsky's predictions about such objects would end up being refuted by anyone who adopted this diluted/'dialectical' version of the LOI!

Such experimenters would succeed in confirming the absolute version of the 'law' by adopting a weaker variant of it!

Conversely, the more exactly the experimenters adhered to Trotsky's instructions, the more likely it would be that they detected non-identical weights. In that case, they would succeed in disconfirming the absolute version of this 'law' by applying an exact copy of Trotsky's instructions! So, by reverse irony, they would refute Trotsky in practice by doing exactly as he instructed, using the LOI applied to instructions to disconfirm it as applied to bags of sugar!

Some might think all this irrelevant; if things change, who cares what causes it? But, Trotsky is here appealing to the results of an experiment -- one that he clearly did not carry out -- to substantiate a claim about all objects everywhere in the entire universe, and for all of time. It now turns out that because of that thesis itself, it might not be possible to verify some of his claims. If so, we are still owed an explanation as to why Trotsky thought it correct to say everything changes all the time, when this cannot be confirmed. And this is not just because many of the above complications could cancel each other out or mask a temporary lack of change in other things, it is because we do not have access to most regions of space and time!

Relying on evidence alone, therefore, Trotsky was certainly not justified in projecting his conclusions as far as he thought he could --, i.e., across the entire universe, and for all of time; not least because he evidently performed no experiments himself.

But, even if this could be confirmed, and even if it were argued that all the available evidence supports the thesis of universal change, then this would be to no avail either, and that is because all such experiments and arguments/claims would themselves be based on identically performed observations, as we have seen (above). If they weren't then we could not trust the results.

Finally, and most damningly, Trotsky (and Hegel) failed to notice that if anything changes then whatever it is identical with will change equally quickly. In that case, identity is no enemy of change.

With that observation, dialectics completely falls apart.

Again, much more detail can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm

[The whole of the above long essay is devoted to Trotsky's argument.]

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

[CyM]

Rosa, it's nothing personal, you're just not as important in the movement as either Burnham or Dühring.

Besides which, Trotsky and Engels didn't engage in a polemic with those two because they thought they could ever convince them. As with you, it was clear they were long past the point of being won back to this fundamental method of Marxism. They took them on in order to expose their ideas and educate the best layers as to how wrong those two were.

I don't have much time to waste responding to your long-winded and inconsistent arguments, but I certainly don't have any time to respond to you when no one else worth convincing is even around.

We both know it's a waste of time trying to convince each other, so unless there are others who may be won over by either of us, I think you'll agree with me that we've done this dance too many times already and it's not worth debating yet again between us.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cym:

Rosa, it's nothing personal, you're just not as important in the movement as either Burnham or Dühring

I'm glad to hear it, but the fact still remains, not one of you can respond effectively to my demolition of this 'theory' of yours.

As with you, it was clear they were long past the point of being won back to this fundamental method of Marxism.

But, as you know, I accept the fundamentals of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky's theories. I just reject the mystical accretion you lot can't defend.

inconsistent arguments

Well, just point out which parts are inconsistent then.

Go on, I double dog dare you...

And, Anti-Dühring is 'long-winded'. When I am brief and to the point, comrades like you accuse me of superficiality. When I go into detail, we get 'I haven't time...'.

Excuse after excuse...

We both know it's a waste of time trying to convince each other, so unless there are others who may be won over by either of us, I think you'll agree with me that we've done this dance too many times already and it's not worth debating yet again between us.

In fact, you have always shied away, with similar excuses.

[VNredhero]

for a long time i think i can understand basic "dialectic"   and i can apply it in my life and the way i think about social, world, people, event,............  
first, the "dialectic" is opposite to "mechanical"    

-  see "the whole picture" first.... you shold care about "the whole, entire, all, global" before "the detail, the small, local,....."   if things are very complex,,,,, you should simplize it and generalize it..... because you can't    understand  "the details" if you don't understand "the whole"...... if things complex you should "STEP BACK" and "OVERVIEW" or "SCAN"  it.   ..... this is similar to "SYSTEM THINKING" or "HOLISM"    because you can't become a socialist   if you only think about the "detail",   you so  selfish and one-sided...........  look WIDE

-synchronize your information, don't make them to be in disorder, chaos.... everything must have their order...
 -more creativity and freedom with your thought,,,   human are not machine    and you can't become a revolution if you is'nt  CREATIVITY.....  revolution must be new and changed

-you can see about the relationships between things.  when you see A you should see what things include A inside.  relate between A and B, A and C, A and D, A and E......... relate between part make the whole... you should COMPARE between them, you check about the SAME and the DIFFERENT between them...   the "MAP THINKING" of TONY BUZAN is a brilliant tool to understand it... you should read his book..... there are many type of relations:  tree,  continuous, equal relation, web relation.....etc......... his book is only about the tree and i don't like that

-after understand the whole, you should get deep inside and get more details,, this is very important because if you stop at the general, general and general, you only get 6-7/10 mark      if you under stand deep, you can get 8-9 mark/10 :D :D :D    CAREFUL not CARELESS..   look DEEP --- and you can do this many  times to get more detail from the basic  information,,,

-and more............

the dialectic is very familiar with fine art, drawing, painting, ........ PICASSO :D understand it :D

[VNredhero]

the dialectic use right brain more than "mechanical"  you can search on goog  
 
"the DIALECTIC is the ART, the ART of THINKING........................."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that VNredhero, but I'm not too sure how any of it helps us understand this 'theory', or resolves the many fatal problems I have exposed.

[VNredhero]

ok but what prolem? i can know?       it's very useful when i read a book, or something... you can understand it..... you can undertsand many other theory with IT.......  do you ever read Lao Tzu of CHina????? i think he is the first man of Dialectical..... with Yin and Yang theory..... and now is  Marx

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that, but it's far from easy to figure out what you are saying -- hence it's difficult for me to answer you.

And yes I have read Lao Tzu, but he is no less confused than western dialecticians are. The fact that these ideas crop up time and again, East and West, just goes to show that Marx was right when he said that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.