@nti-dialectics Made Easy

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Several months ago, a handful of comrades asked me to publish an Essay that made my objections to dialectical materialism more accessible to the absolute novice.

I have now written that Essay.

Recall it is confined to very basic ideas (all of which are greatly expanded upon at my site), and that many of the links to other sites on the internet have been ommited in this copy of part of it.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Logic

Dialecticians are fond of saying things like this:

"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [Rob Sewell.]

However, I have yet to see a single quotation from a logic text that supports such claims -- certainly dialecticians have yet to offer one. And no wonder: it is completely incorrect.

Formal Logic [FL] uses variables, that is letters to stand for named objects, designated expressions (some of these are called "predicates"), and the like -- all of which can and do change.

This policy was introduced by the very first logician (that we know of) in the West, Aristotle, and approximately 1500 years before the same tactic was used in mathematics by Muslim Algebraists (and, indeed, several centuries before Descartes used the same device).

Of the latter individual, Engels said the following:

"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels (1954), p.258.]

Just like Engels, no one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why this is denied of FL is somewhat unclear.

With very little variation between them, dialecticians also like to say things like the following:

"The basic laws of formal logic are:

1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').
2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').
3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.91. Quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Even a cursory examination of logic texts will show that not only are the above claims incorrect, not even Aristotle's logic was based on these so-called 'laws'. Sure, many claim that Aristotle founded his logic on these 'laws', but they have yet to produce the evidence. [More on this here.]

The 'Law of Identity' [LOI] will be examined presently, but the 'Law of Contradiction' [LOC] merely says that if one proposition is true then its contradictory is false, and vice versa -- or, in some versions found in mathematical logic, this 'law' says that no contradiction can be true, but must be false. It says nothing about "equality".

[The version given by Woods and Grant above was in fact borrowed from Hegel, who made the same mistake. This is destructively analysed here.]

Likewise, the 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM] says nothing about objects being identical, or otherwise, merely that any proposition has to be either true or false, there is no third option.

[Some claim that Quantum Mechanics [QM], among other things, has refuted this 'law', but QM has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition.]

The LOI is equally badly handled in DM-texts; this is because dialecticians have unwisely accepted the garbled ideas they found in Hegel's Logic [On this, see here.]

The basic idea behind the hackneyed DM-criticism of the LOI seems to be this:

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

Fortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self. So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine when or if it has occurred. [More on this here.]

Motion

Almost as if they are singing from the same hymn sheet, dialecticians like to argue with Engels that:

"...[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another[,] [t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]

This is an ancient confusion (derived from a paradox invented by an Ancient Greek thinker called Zeno). As seems obvious, since most objects (that are not mathematical points) actually occupy several places at once, and can be in one place and not be in it at the same time (for example, a car can be in a garage but not wholly in it, having been parked three-quarters in, one quarter out), and stationary all the while, the alleged contradiction above does not distinguish moving from stationary bodies. So, if the proverbial cat falls asleep half on and half off a mat, it will be in several places at once, and in (or on) and not in (or on) two or more of them -- but stationary for all that.

Worse, Engels's account would have an object moving between locations outside of time (that is with time not having advanced at all), otherwise that object could not be in two places at once. This is impossible to reconcile with a materialist view of reality.

Finally, this 'contradiction' is based on ambiguities in Engels's use of words like "moment" and "place", which means that once these have been resolved, the 'contradiction' disappears. [More details here.]

DM: Imposed On Nature

Often we find these seemingly modest disclaimers in DM-texts:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13.]

However, when we examine what DM-theorists actually do, as opposed to what they say they do, we find that the exact opposite is the case. For example, Engels went on to claim the following of motion:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]

Had this observation been derived from the facts available in Engels's day (a policy to which he has just sworn allegiance), he would have expressed himself as follows:

"Evidence so far suggests that motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has matter without motion been observed, but it is too early to say if must always be the case…. Matter without motion is not inconceivable, nor is motion without matter, we just haven't witnessed either yet…." [Re-vamped version of Engels (1976), p.74.]

[It is worth noting that matter without motion is not inconceivable; that very idea had been a fundamental precept of Aristotelian Physics.]

As is easy to demonstrate, all dialecticians do likewise (the evidence can be found here). First they disarm the reader with the sort of claims Engels rehearsed, then, sometimes in the same paragraph, they proceed to do the exact opposite, imposing dialectics on nature. Why they do this will be examined below.

Traditional Thought

In the West, since Ancient Greek times, traditional theorists have been imposing their theories on nature. This practice is so widespread, and has penetrated into thought so deeply, that no one notices it, even after it has been pointed out to them. [Or they fail to see its significance. More on that below, too.]

If you belong to a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways. The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things). Another way is to persuade the majority that the present order works for their benefit, or is ordained of the gods, or is 'natural' and cannot be fought. The latter tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies. All of these were imposed on reality.

This is how Marx depicted things:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance...." [The German Ideology, quoted from here.]

However, as Marx also noted, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us. In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old Theogonies and myths were no longer relevant. In the newly emerging Republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were needed. Enter Philosophy.

From its inception, Philosophers constructed abstract systems (and the like) -- ones that were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which they then imposed on nature. Since nature was mind (or the product on Mind), the human mind could safely project its products onto it. As above, so below, as the old Hermetic saying went.

This ancient tradition changed many times throughout history as different Modes of Production rose and fell, but the overall strategy remained the same: the derivation of abstract theories that supposedly revealed the underlying rational structure of reality, hidden from the disconfirming gaze of working people (which is why they were, and still are, inexpressible in ordinary language). [More on this below.]

So, like Theology, but in this case far more abstract and increasingly secular, Philosophy came to reflect the 'essential' structure that supposedly underpinned and rationalised alienated class society, mystified now by the use of increasingly baroque language -- and jargon.

Dialectics was invented by a quintessentially Idealist Philosopher working in this tradition (Hegel), and it was appropriated by Marxist classicists before the working class could provide a materialist counter-weight to it. DM was born from idealism, and as we will see, has never escaped from it (despite the materialist flip DM-apologists claim to have inflicted on it).

And that is why Dialecticians impose their ideas on nature: they too are working in a tradition that was not built by working people and which does not serve the latter's interests. So, for all their claim to be radical, DM-theorists are thoroughly conservative when it comes to Philosophy.

Indeed, despite the fact that they appear to be challenging traditional ideas, their practice reveals that dialecticians have located themselves in a tradition in Philosophy that is quite happy to derive fundamental truths about nature from mere jargon, just as ruling-class theorists have always done.

To be sure, the attempt made in the Essays posted at this site to break from this tradition is met with derision and disbelief (but, so far, no contrary arguments) by the few dialecticians that have bothered to read them -- so deep have traditional ideas sunk into their class-compromised brains.

The Laws of Dialectics

This age-old tactic (of imposing theses onto nature) can be seen if we examine Engels's so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics':

"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Engels (1954), p.17.]

All dialecticians (who accept these 'Laws') impose them on nature (the evidence for this can be found here and here). What little data dialecticians supply to substantiate these 'Laws' is not only woefully insufficient, it is highly contentious, to say the least.

Anyone who has studied and practiced genuine science will know the lengths to which researchers have to go to alter even minor aspects of current theory, let alone justify major changes in the way we view nature. In stark contrast, dialecticians invariably offer a few paragraphs of trite (and over-used) clichés to support their claims. At its best, the evidence they offer is second hand, specially-selected, and covers (in the case of Woods and Grant (1996) -- which is the 'best' defence yet of classical hard-core DM) a few hundred pages (which have been padded out with repetition and bluster) of secondary evidence. In many ways, this attempt to support Engels's 'Laws' resembles Creationist literature: it is highly compressed, repetitive, selective and contentious.

The First 'Law', the alleged change of quantity into quality ignores the many cases in nature where change is not "nodal":

"Hegel invented the nodal line of measure relations, in which small quantitative changes at a certain point give rise to a qualitative leap. The example is often given of water, which boils at 100?C at normal atmospheric pressure. As the temperature nears boiling point, the increase in heat does not immediately cause the water molecules to fly apart. Until it reaches boiling point, the water keeps its volume. It remains water, because of the attraction of the molecules for each other. However, the steady change in temperature has the effect of increasing the motion of the molecules. The volume between the atoms is gradually increased, to the point where the force of attraction is insufficient to hold the molecules together. At precisely 100?C, any increase in heat energy will cause the molecules to fly apart, producing steam." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.49.]

Not everything in nature changes in this way; consider melting glass, metal, rock, butter, plastic.... [More details here.]

And not every change in quality is produced by quantitative differences; there are many chemicals that have exactly the same material content, and energy levels, but are qualitatively different because of the different spatial arrangement of their constituent atoms. [More examples here.]

Moreover, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that both "quantity" and "quality" have been characterised by DM-theorists, They seldom, if ever, bother to define these terms (in fact, I have yet to find an example where this has been done) -- can you imagine this happening in genuine science?

The other 'Laws' fare no better. Change though 'internal contradiction' will be examined in the next sub-section, but the "Negation of the Negation" [NON] depends for its 'plausibility' on the confusion of linguistic with material categories, in a thoroughly traditional manner. [More details here.]

Second half soon....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Internal Contradictions

Lenin expressed this idea thus:

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]

There are several serious problems with this since it suggests that things are self-moving. In fact, Lenin did more than suggest, he insisted that we see things this way:

"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]

Other Marxists talk the same way. Here are comrades Woods and Grant:

"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....

"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....

"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"...Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72. Bold emphases added.]

But, if this were so, then nothing in nature would or could have any effect on anything else. Hence, while you might think that it is your kick that moves a ball, according to the above, the ball moves itself.

Now, in order to avoid such absurd consequences, dialecticians have had to allow for the existence of "external contradictions", ones that are somehow also involved in change. [More details here.] But, as seems clear, this makes a mockery of the idea that all change is internally-generated. What becomes of Lenin's "insistence" if everything that changes violates this caveat?

Also, DM-theorists appeal to "internal contradictions" in order to undercut theism:

"The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.

"Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.

"No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the "initial push"....

"No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter,  any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning.... But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning....

"So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things themselves." [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43.]

But, if external causes are now to be permitted in order to stop this theory becoming absurd (as we saw above), then that will merely allow 'god' sneak in through the back door.

Of course, all this is independent of whether or not it makes sense to say that anything in nature or society can be described as contradictory. Dialecticians, following Hegel, certainly believe so, but up until now they have merely been content to assert this for a fact, forgetting the proof.

But even if objects and processes all possessed "internal contradictions" just as DM-theorists suppose, they could not explain why anything moved or changed. In fact, as is easy to confirm, dialecticians have been hopelessly unclear as to whether things change because of their internal contradictions (and/or opposites), or whether they change into these opposites, or, indeed, whether they create such opposites when they change. Of course, if the latter were the case, the alleged opposites could not cause change, since they are produced by it. If the second were true, then we would see things like males naturally turning into females, fathers into sons, and left hands into right hands. [On this, see here.]

But why should an (internal) opposite make something change? In order to answer this question, dialecticians have appealed to forces (of attraction and repulsion) to explain how and why their mysterious 'contradictions' are capable of actually moving bits of matter about the place.

Unfortunately, the nature of forces is a mystery to this day; this is one reason why scientists have abandoned them, preferring to talk about exchange of energy and momentum instead. Of course, in popular and school physics, people still talk about forces, but since there is no way of giving them any sort of physical sense (other than as part of a vector field, etc.), advanced physics translates forces in the way indicated. Indeed, in Relativity Theory, the 'force' of gravity has been replaced by the movement of objects along "geodesics".

Even Woods and Grant concede this point:

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]

This is re-iterated by Professor Wilzcek (of MIT):

"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'"

This is probably why Engels said the following:

"When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), p.71. Bold emphasis added. A copy of this can be found here.]

But, if there are no classical forces, then there can't be any (dialectical) contradictions in nature --, 'external' or 'internal' (or, at least, none that can make anything happen).

So, if there are such 'contradictions' in nature, they do no work.

[However, this is a complex issue; for more details I can only refer the reader to my extensive discussion here and here.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Practice

When Lenin asserted the following:

"From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality." [Lenin (1961), p.171.]

he was merely underlining ideas that all Dialectical Marxists hold in common. Hence, it is not enough for revolutionaries to try to develop the right theory to explain the world, these ideas must be tested and refined in practice. Indeed, no theory could be the 'correct one' without its intimate and 'dialectical' connection with political activity.

As Rob Sewell points out:

"Marxists have always stressed the unity of theory and practice. 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it', as Marx pointed to in his thesis on Feuerbach. 'If the truth is abstract it must be untrue,' states Hegel. All truth is concrete. We have to look at things as they exist, with a view to understanding their underlying contradictory development. This has very important conclusions, especially for those fighting to change society....

"The idealist view of the world grew out of the division of labour between physical and mental labour. This division constituted an enormous advance as it freed a section of society from physical work and allowed them the time to develop science and technology. However, the further removed from physical labour, the more abstract became their ideas. And when thinkers separate their ideas from the real world, they become increasingly consumed by abstract "pure thought" and end up with all types of fantasies. Today, cosmology is dominated by complex abstract mathematical conceptions, which have led to all sorts of weird and wonderful erroneous theories: the Big Bang, beginning of time, parallel universes, etc. Every break with practice leads to a one-sided idealism." [Quoted from here.]

Woods and Grant concur:

"The ability to think in abstractions marks a colossal conquest of the human intellect. Not only "pure" science, but also engineering would be impossible without abstract thought, which lifts us above the immediate, finite reality of the concrete example, and gives thought a universal character. The unthinking rejection of abstract thought and theory indicates the kind of narrow, Philistine mentality, which imagines itself to be "practical," but, in reality, is impotent. Ultimately, great advances in theory lead to great advances in practice. Nevertheless, all ideas are derived one way or another from the physical world, and, ultimately, must be applied back to it. The validity of any theory must be demonstrated, sooner or later, in practice." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.84-85.]

Unfortunately, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Marxists; indeed they have been even more unkind to Trotskyists like Woods, Grant and Sewell. All Four Internationals have failed, the 1917 revolution has been reversed, and we are no nearer (and arguably much further way from) a Worker's State than Lenin was in 1918. So, if truth is tested in practice, practice delivers its verdict: DM cannot be true.

However, faced with such devastating facts, dialecticians have responded in a number of ways: 1) They deny that Marxism is an abject failure; 2) They blame all this on 'objective' factors; or 3) They ignore the problem.

There does not seem to be much point, therefore, in dialecticians claiming that dialectics guides all they do, and avowing that truth is tested in practice, if, when that practice reveals its verdict, that verdict is denied, ignored or excused.

1) Those who think Marxism is a ringing success have so far failed to show where and how it is. Presumably there is a Workers' State on the outer fringes of the Galaxy?

Hardcore denial of reality of this order of magnitude is difficult to counter (just as it is difficult to counter the Christian Scientists who claim that matter is the error of mortal mind); anyone who can look at the international situation and fail to see that the vast majority of workers have not been seized by Marxism is probably a danger to him or herself.

"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." [Marx (1843), p.251; quoted from here.]

[There is a more involved explanation of this selective blindness in Essay Nine Part Two, which has yet to be published (summary here).]

2) Certainly there have been objective factors that have hindered the revolutionary movement (such as a relatively well-organised, rich, powerful and focussed ruling class, nationalism and sectionalism among workers, a growing economy, etc., etc.), but the above comrades were quite specific: the veracity of a theory can only be tested in practice, and since the latter requires the subjective input of active revolutionaries, this aspect of practice has badly failed. So, whether or not there have been 'objective factors', practice has refuted the subjective side of Marxism: dialectics.

Now, since the Essays at this site show that DM is not so much false as far too confused even to be assessed for its truth or falsity, the long term failure of Marxism is no surprise. And since this theory arose from the brains of card-carrying ruling-class theorists (like Hegel), this is doubly no surprise.

3) This is probably the safest option for dialecticians to adopt: ignore the problem. It is certainly the best bet for the long-term interests of the ruling-class, since it prevents the serious theoretical problems that afflict our movement from being addressed, guaranteeing another century of failure on our part. They could not have designed a better theory to screw with our heads (and provoke a monumental waste of time as our best theorists try to grapple with Hegel's fluent Martian) if they tried.

All this is quite apart from the fact that practice cannot distinguish between correct and incorrect theories. Incorrect theories can often work (and for thousands of years -- for example, Ptolemaic Astronomy, which became increasingly accurate over time), and correct ones can fail (for example, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which failed to be observed until the 1838, with the work of Friedrich Bessel). [More examples of both are given in Essay Ten (summary here).]

And even if this were not so, and success were indeed a criterion of truth, since we do not yet have a socialist society on earth, we will only know if Marxism is correct after the event. So, this criterion cannot tell us whether Marxism is correct now. Indeed, the following declaration could come true:

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." [Marx and Engels (1848), pp.35-36. Bold emphasis added.]

According to this, the "contending classes" could wipe each other out, or at least lead to their "common ruin" (which denouement is not easy to square with the NON). Of course, if that were to happen, it would declare all theories false (if, that is, the criterion that truth is tested in practice were itself correct).

Pragmatic theories, like this one, are hostages to fortune; those who accept them should feign no surprise if history takes no note of their hermetically-compromised ideas.

The full Essay (along with its links and references) can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The above Essay has now been re-written to make the argument clearer, with new material added.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

[OUTOFTHENIGHT]

Rosa
I hope you dont mind me asking but who are you and are you involved in the Marxist movement??

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Out of the Night:

I hope you dont mind me asking but who are you and are you involved in the Marxist movement??

Not at all.

I have been involved in revolutionary politics since the early 1980's (and I have been a trade unionist even longer); I am not at present fully active in any party, since I am devoting most of my time to my site, my job and my trade union work (I am an unpaid activist). When this has finished, I will throw myself back into revolutionary politics.

You can find more details about me here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2001.htm

This Essay explains why I am attacking this theory, my methods, my aims and the tone I have set.

I recognise that it is nigh on impossible for comrades to recognise that a fellow Trotskyist (like me) can be so against a theory that has dominated Marxist thinking and activity for over 150 years. But, the long record of our failure (and the role I claim that dialectics has played in this) -- coupled with the fact that I could never accept such a lamentably poor theory -- have motivated this attack.

A few non-Marxist critics have tried to attack materialist dialectics, but from a position of almost total ignorance and as a way to rubbish Marxism itself.

This is not true of me. My aim is to make our movement less sectarian and more successful.

I accept historical materialsim 100%.

[OUTOFTHENIGHT]

So you live in the UK. Can I asume you used to be in the SWP?
What union are you a member of?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OOTN: I do not propose to reveal any more of my personal details than I have already done.

[OUTOFTHENIGHT]

OOTN: I do not propose to reveal any more of my personal details than I have already done.

That reveals alot to me.

You say

'Unfortunately, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Marxists; indeed they have been even more unkind to Trotskyists like Woods, Grant and Sewell. All Four Internationals have failed, the 1917 revolution has been reversed, and we are no nearer (and arguably much further way from) a Worker's State than Lenin was in 1918. So, if truth is tested in practice, practice delivers its verdict: DM cannot be true.'

After a  quote from Grant/Woods.

Arent perspectives conditional?

Is that not a 'mechanical' analysis?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OOTN:

That reveals a lot to me.

Perhaps you should focus less on personal details then?

Is that not a 'mechanical' analysis?

The section you commented on here was taken from a Basic Introductory Essay, at the beginning of which I also say:

Please note that this Essay deals with very basic issues -- even at the risk of serious distortion.

It has only been ventured upon because a handful of comrades (who were not well-versed in Philosophy) wanted a very simple guide to my principle arguments against DM.

Hence, it is not aimed at experts!

Anyone who objects to the superficial nature of the analysis/claims made below must take these caveats into account or navigate away from this page. It is not intended for them.

Those wanting more details should consult the relevant Essays published at the main site.

You either missed this caveat, or failed to take note of it.

I have not yet published the Essay in which I attempt to show how and why this 'theory' has failled our movement for so long, although I have published a summary of its main points here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-9.htm

[OUTOFTHENIGHT]

I didnt miss it. I wasnt looking for it.

Im trying to work through your anti dialectics site. Its going to take a while.

Tell me ,if you call yourself a Marxist /leninist/trotskyist how can you be against dialectical materialism which is central to being one of these things.
Just give me a link to one of your essays if you think its easier

[OUTOFTHENIGHT]

A question. Did Marx reject Hegel?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OOTN:

Tell me ,if you call yourself a Marxist /leninist/trotskyist how can you be against dialectical materialism which is central to being one of these things.

Just give me a link to one of your essays if you think its easier

I purposely wrote this simplified Essay to tackle such questions; here is what I said:

Some may wonder how I can claim adherence both to Leninism and to Trotskyism given the highly critical things I say about philosophical ideas that have been part of these two traditions from the beginning. However, to give an analogy, we can surely be highly critical of Newton's mystical ideas while accepting the scientific nature of his other work. The same applies here.

I count myself as a Marxist, a Leninist and a Trotskyist since I fully accept not just HM (once Hegel's influence has been excised), but the political ideas associated with the life and work of Lenin and Trotsky.

Here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

And I add this:

(4) Some might wonder how I can count myself as both a Leninist and a Trotskyist while making such profound criticisms of the ideas that both of these traditions regard as fundamental to Marxism.

Well, we can recognise Newton's genius while we ignore his Alchemical and Kabbalistic writings, just as we can severely criticise him for wasting his time on such worthless pursuits. The same applies to the writings of Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. Hence, even though I hold their work in politics, economics and history in the highest esteem, I am equally critical of the mystical gobbledygook they introduced into our movement.

In fact, and on the contrary, a slavish acceptance of everything these great comrades had to say about dialectics -- just because they said it, and just because the vast majority of comrades think highly of it --, would be to spit on their graves.

Marxism, if it is anything, is not a personality cult. Or if it is, then Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky would have been the first to have turned their backs on it.

The radical tradition was built on a lack of respect for tradition. No less so here.

Here: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/

Your question about Marx and Hegel is, howver, more complex.

Under the influence of Feuerbach and others he broke with hegel in the early 1840's, and he moved away from him progressively for the next few years.

But he sort of hovered closer them further away from him over the next twenty or so years.

This is what I argue on this (links etc from the original have been left out here):

Well: Have You Read And Fully Understood The Whole Of Hegel's Logic?

The alarming facts upon which the above allegations supervene are thrown into even starker relief by Lenin's surprising and oft-quoted remark that not a single Marxist up until his day -- which must have included Engels, Dietzgen, Kautsky, Luxemburg, and Plekhanov -- actually understood Marx's Capital, since none of them had fully mastered Hegel's Logic!

"It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases added.]9

Clearly, Lenin's aside raises serious questions of its own. If professional revolutionaries find Hegel's work impossibly difficult to comprehend (few in my experience bother to consult much of what Hegel wrote, let alone attempt to study the entire Logic -- but, which one (there were in fact two 'Logics'!)?), is it credible that workers themselves can understand the whole of his Logic fully? In which case -- if Lenin is correct --, what chance is there that anyone (revolutionary or worker) will ever make head or tail of Marx's Capital?10

Even worse, Lenin's comments suggest that only a tiny fraction (if that!) of revolutionaries have ever fully understood Marxism (or, at least Capital). Lenin is quite clear: only those Marxists who have "thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic" (emphasis added) can claim to comprehend Capital; short of that they can't. Again, how many revolutionaries have thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic (let alone read it) since Lenin's day? Even professional philosophers find that work daunting, and of those who claim to understand it, the presumption must be that that is an empty boast until they succeed in explaining it clearly to the rest of us.11

Nevertheless, a far more serious and intractable question is the following: How would it be possible to decide if anyone has ever actually understood all of Hegel's Logic?  

Plainly, we can't enquire of Hegel what the correct interpretation of his work is. Even Lenin himself failed to provide us with a comprehensive (or comprehensible) account of all of Hegel's Logic. And, as we know with regard to the interpretation of that other (but far less) obscure book -- The Bible --, it is always open for someone to claim that their interpretation is the correct one, while all the rest aren't, with no empirically viable way of deciding between them.

Of course, as we shall see, this is precisely what allows sectarians to impose their own brand orthodoxy on their corner of the militant market.12

Indeed, buried in here somewhere is one of the main reasons for the ideological sectarianism that appears to be endemic in revolutionary Marxism; the Logic is to DM as The Bible is to Theology. In both of these books, a 'correct' interpretation functions as a test of orthodoxy; their use is both a source of mystification and a guarantor of righteousness.

Moreover, as is easy to demonstrate, this fact helps DM-adepts find whatever post hoc justifications they require to 'justify' inconsistent, undemocratic tactical manoeuvring -- or counter-revolutionary activity -- as the need arises. Furthermore, as is the case with other sacred texts -- where priests, theologians and assorted 'holy men' claim exclusive interpretive rights --, in Dialectical Marxism only a few self-selected Dialectical Magi can 'rightly' claim to 'understand' the Logic (and "dialectics"), even if they find it impossible to prove this by explaining it clearly to anyone this side of the Kuiper Belt.

This being so, few among the rank-and-file will feel confident (or foolish) enough to question the theoretical deliverances made on their behalf by the likes of Stalin, Mao, Mandel, Healy, Pablo, Grant, Avakian -- or whoever.13

Another analogy (drawn once more with the numinous) springs to mind here: there would be little point in anyone complaining that the pronouncements and tactical zigzags mentioned above were inconsistent (in themselves or with whatever passed for orthodoxy just the day before); that would only show that the said complainer had failed to "understand dialectics". Consistency is no more to be expected of dialecticians than it is of Doctors of Divinity, and in this case perhaps less. The Deity and The Dialectic move in mysterious and contradictory ways; the Divine Mind is no less baffling than is DM.14

Of course, few scientists would be foolish enough to make similar claims for any of the classics of science -- not even of Darwin's Origin or Newton's Principia --, that only if the latter were studied from end to end, and thoroughly understood, could an aspiring researcher/student claim to comprehend modern science. One guesses that only a minority of scientists have actually read all or most of the classics in their field, but that fact does not materially affect their work.15

Now, even though revolutionary theory is different from other scientific disciplines, that does not mean that incomprehensible philosophical texts must be treated in such a theological way, with every word regarded as required reading, and every syllable understood, before initiation can begin. And yet, Lenin's aside indicates that this is exactly how Hegel's Logic should be viewed by the DM-faithful: only the correct understanding of this intractably obscure work -- in its entirety -- is sufficient to allow novice socialists to proceed to the next level and try to understand Marx's classic, and before they too can presume to spread the Good News.

Of course, this is all rather puzzling since Marx himself never claimed this of his own work.16

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Notes

9. Of course, it is entirely possible that Lenin was merely commenting on contemporaneous Marxists, thus absolving Engels. However, what he does say fails to support this interpretation:

"It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases added.]

This looks pretty clear that in the last fifty years prior to Lenin: "none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" (emphasis added) --, not (note!) "some of the Marxists". In TAR, John Rees suggests that the above comment was aimed at Plekhanov and/or Second International Marxism; this is also possible, but once again, Lenin's use of the word "none" here does not support this view.

Nevertheless, as Rees also says:

"In these fragmentary notes, Lenin formulates some of the most precise definitions of key concepts in Marxist philosophy available anywhere. The dialectic itself, for instance, has never been better explained…." [Rees (1998), p.185.]

High praise like this must mean that Engels's account was deficient in some way.

Question: In what way could that be?

Answer: Engels's version of DM was not wedded closely enough to Hegel's Logic.

That can only mean that Engels did not understand Capital!

On the other hand, if the dialectic has never been better explained, and Lenin's book is full of incomprehensible sentences, what does this say about the dialectic? Can anyone explain it in comprehensible terms? Has anyone?

In order to counter such ridiculous consequences, two comrades -- i.e., Woods and Grant [in Woods and Grant (1995), p.76] -- have argued that Lenin was deliberately exaggerating here. This is, of course, also entirely possible, but it is certainly not the way Lenin has been interpreted by subsequent Marxists. [Indeed, Woods and Grant quote this passage here with no qualifications attached to it.]

On this, note Andy Blunden's comments:

"Hegel is the philosophical predecessor of Marx, and we have Lenin's word for it that Marx cannot be understood without first understanding Hegel." [Empson (2005), p.166.]

Naturally, this passage of Lenin's helps account for something that would otherwise be inexplicable: the fascination that Hegel's Logic has exercised on prominent revolutionaries -- including STD's and OT's. If Lenin was merely exaggerating --, or that is how he had been always been perceived --, this would not have happened.

[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]

For example, not only do we find a Trotskyist of the stature of Raya Dunayevskaya writing several books in the futile attempt to comprehend Hegel's Logic, we witness her reiterating this famous claim (albeit watered down a tad):

"Here, specifically, we see the case of Lenin, who had gone back to Hegel, and had stressed that it was impossible to understand Capital, especially its first chapter, without reading the whole of the Science…." [Dunayevskaya (2002), p.328.]

And, this is what Bertell Ollman had to say:

"Even from this brief outline, it is apparent that Marx's Hegelian heritage is too complex to allow simple characterization. Hegel never ceased being important for Marx, as Lenin, for example, perceived when he wrote in his notebook in 1914, 'It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapters, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx'" [Ollman (1976), p.35; a copy of this can be found here.]

There is a list of other prominent Marxists who agree with Lenin -- as well as another list of those who do not -- in Burns (2000), p.99, Notes 2 and 4.

Nevertheless, if this is the only way that these remarks of Lenin's can be defused by Woods and Grant (i.e., by claiming that Lenin was indulging in hyperbole), the question naturally arises as to why they took other (even more absurd) statements in PN literally.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that Lenin himself admitted that he found certain parts of Hegel's Logic impossibly obscure, or just plain nonsense. [Cf., Lenin (1961), pp.103, 108, 117, 229.]

Hence, if correct, this would mean that even Lenin did not understand Capital!

"It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases added.]

Notice that Lenin did not refer to just 99.9% of Hegel's Logic, but the "whole" of it.

Is this yet another internal contradiction that forces us to change our view of Hegel? Surely it must be so if Lenin is correct in insisting that "everything existing" (including the existing passage above) is a UO.

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:]…Internally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]… as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….” [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-60.]

Or is this just another "exaggeration"?

Finally, there is no evidence that Marx himself made this claim about his own work -- nor is there any that he had ever thoroughly studied and thoroughly understood Hegel's 'Logic'. This either means that the Logic is largely irrelevant to any student of Capital, or Marx did not understand his own book! [However, on this, see Note 16, below.]

10. While there are two different works commonly called Hegel's Logic (one of which Hegel was in the process of revising when he died -- on this see Carver (2000)), Lenin's notes relate to the Science Of Logic (i.e., Hegel (1999)). However, Lenin was unaware of the important changes Hegel had made to this book. So was Marx. Does this mean that one or both (Lenin and/or Marx) did not understand Capital? It seems they must if Lenin were right. [Again, on this, see Carver (2000).]

This does not, of course, mean that workers cannot understand Capital, but if Lenin were right it would be remarkable if anyone on earth could!

11. I, for one, will not be holding my breath. We have already seen one attempt fail badly here and here. More on this in Essay Twelve.

However, the best book I have read so far on this, which attempts to make Hegel comprehensible, is Beiser (2005). Even so, Beiser has to paper over the serious problems that face anyone attempting to interpret Hegel, and even he has to translate the latter's impenetrable prose into ordinary-ish sort of English to complete the job. [On this problem, see here.]

Naturally, this just raises the question whether Beiser's Hegel is Hegel's Hegel, or is Beiser's Hegel. And that, like all such questions, is unanswerable.

12. Again, this is not to suggest that the roots of sectarianism are merely ideological, just that it helps considerably if the faithful have an obscure book (or set of books) on which to base their ideas. For example, such a 'holy book' encourages the need for 'orthodoxy', and that fosters the idea that only certain 'leaders' are 'authorised' to impose the 'right sort' and amount of it.

To that end, the more obscure the book, the better. Without doubt then Hegel's Logic gets the Gold medal in this regard.

[As TV cop Kojak once said (but of something else!), "It sure beats the hell out of whatever's in second place!"]

13. Lest this comment appears to associate the present author with certain well-known anti-Marxists (who seem to say somewhat similar things), it is worth noting that the points made here are specifically aimed at the ideological use of mystification, whosoever indulges in it (and that includes such anti-Marxist critics themselves).

As will be agued in Part Two of this Essay (summary here), if Lenin was guilty of doing this he did so unwittingly; he was clearly unaware of the significance of the ideas that Engels had imported into the movement. The same goes for other great revolutionaries (including Engels himself). My argument is thus not with their sincerity -- nor yet with their revolutionary fervour -- but with their philosophical judgement and their emotional susceptibilities.

14. Once more, the comments in the text might appear to some to be a re-hash of the hackneyed idea that Marxism is a quasi-religion. Nothing could be further from the truth. As will be argued in more detail in Part Two: only in so far as DM induces revolutionaries to adopt a dogmatic metaphysic is the analogy with Theology at all apt. [In fact, as we will see, the motivation to accept dialectics is not unlike that which motivates commitment to religious belief.]

So, while Marxism itself is not a religion, Dialectical Marxism is all too uncannily like one.

15. Even if this is incorrect, and it should turn out that most scientists have studied the classics in their field, their practice is certainly not now informed by this fact, and only this fact.

16. In fact, upon learning of the aims of my site, rarely does a dialectically-distracted comrade (mainly those drawn from the HCD-tendency) fail to quote this passage of Lenin's at me, so influential has it become.

[HCD = High Church Dialectician. This is explained in Part Two of this Essay]

Nevertheless, Marx certainly laid down no such preconditions for understanding his work. In fact, if anything he tended to play down Hegel's influence. However, so deep has Lenin's myth sunk into the collective Dialectical Mind that that particular comment will elicit immediate disbelief. But it is nonetheless true for all that. And this is why:

Marx himself pointed out (again, in a side remark) that the relevance of Hegel's Philosophy could be summarised in a few printers' sheets:

"What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident, Freiligrath having found and made me a present of several volumes of Hegel, originally the property of Bakunin. If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified." [Marx to Engels, 16/01/1858; MECW, Volume 40, p.248; copy here.]

Needless to say, Marx never supplied his readers with such a précis. From this we may perhaps draw the conclusion that in the end Marx did not think Hegel's method was all that significant. So, despite all the millions of words he committed to paper, he did not consider it important enough to write out these relatively few pages.

Meanwhile, and in contrast, Marx spent a whole year of his life banging on about Karl Vogt, but still he could not be bothered with this 'vitally important' summary.

[That obscure work of Marx's has so far been deemed unfit to publish on the Marx Internet Archive, so poor is it.]

Even had Marx published this summary, it would still have meant that only a tiny fraction of Hegel's work is relevant to understanding Capital: a few pages!

Attentive readers too will have noticed that Marx says he encountered Hegel's Logic by "accident"; this hardly suggests he was a constant or avid reader of that work. Indeed, he did not even possess his own copy of Hegel's Logic and had to be given one as a present by Freiligrath!

Much has been made of certain references to Hegel in Marx's later work. However, a close reading of these reveals a picture that is different from the standard line retailed by DM-apologists. The scattered remarks about Hegelian Philosophy (that is, outside his analysis of Hegel's political ideas) in Marx's published works are inconclusive. Cf., Carver's remarks noted above, in Note 6.

Marx himself declared:

"...I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker" and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added.]

His use of the word "coquetted" also suggests Hegel's Logic had only a superficial influence, merely confined to certain "modes of expression", and limited to just a few sections of his great work. And as far as Marx "openly" avowing himself a pupil of Hegel, he pointedly put that in the past tense:

"I criticised the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when is was still the fashion. But just when I was working on the first volume of Capital, the ill-humoured, arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a 'dead dog'. I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker" and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Ibid., pp.102-03. Bold emphasis added.]

This is hardly a ringing endorsement, and is equivocal at best; Marx does not say he is now a pupil of Hegel, but that he once was. Of course, it might still have been the case that he was such when the above was written (and this letter tends to support that view), but there is nothing here to suggest that Marx viewed the link between his own and Hegel's work as Lenin did.

Now, John Rees has attempted to neutralise this devastating admission (that the extent of the influence on Marx of Hegel's Logic was no more than a few bits of jargon, used only in places, and with which Marx "coquetted"), by arguing as follows:

"Remarkably, this last quotation is sometimes cited as evidence that Marx was not serious about his debt to Hegel and that he only or merely 'coquetted' with Hegel's phraseology, and that he really did not make any further use of the dialectic. That this interpretation is false should be obvious from this sentence alone. The meaning is clearly that Marx was so keen to identify with Hegel that he 'even' went so far as to use the same terms as 'that mighty thinker' not that he 'only' used those terms." [Rees (1998), p.100.]

Well, if this is so, why did Marx put his praise of Hegel in the past tense, and why did he say that:

"...even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, [he had, RL] coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976, p.103. Bold emphasis added.]

This is quite clear, Marx himself (not me, not Peter Struve, not James Burnham, not Max Eastman...), Marx himself says that he "coquetted" (hardly a serious use of the Logic!) with Hegelian phraseology, and only in places ("here and there"), confined to "the chapter on the theory of value". So, far from "using" such terms, as Rees suggests, he merely "coquetted" with them. Indeed, had this alleged "debt" been so clear, Marx would surely not have had to point it out to us.

[As will become clearer later, it is much easier to attribute core ideas in Capital to Aristotle than it is to Hegel.]

It is now apparent that this is the only "rational kernel" of that mystical theory: the non-serious use of bits of Hegelian jargon, here and there, and confined to one chapter of Marx's most important work!

DM-fans might not like this, but they should pick a fight with Marx for destroying their illusions, not me.

Indeed they do not like this, witness the reception an earlier version of this part of the present Essay received here, and here. Reality is one thing dialectically-distracted comrades are not used to confronting.

Woods and Grant, however, note that Lenin argued that Marx did leave behind a his own version of Hegel's Logic, namely Das Kapital [Woods and Grant (1995), p.76.]. But Marx's own words (that he merely "coquetted" with Hegelian terminology, and only in a few isolated places) shows that this is more than an "exaggeration" on Lenin's part, it's a fabrication.

However Terrell Carver, a noted critic of the 'orthodox' view (that Engels and Marx saw eye-to-eye on everything, and that Hegel exerted a profound influence on Marx), has back-tracked a little, as far as I can see (in Carver (2000)). But, his reasoning here is uncharacteristically obscure. Fortunately, John Rosenthal has neutralised this argument; for more details, see Rosenthal (1998).

Finally, it could be argued that the Grundrisse (i.e., Marx (1973)) is living disproof of much of the above. Well, it would have been had Marx seen fit to publish it, but he didn't, and so it isn't.

But he did publish this:

"...I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker" and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103.]

So, whatever it was that happened to Marx's thinking between the writing of the Grundrisse and the publishing of Das Kapital, it clearly changed his view of Hegel's Logic -- to such an extent that its phraseology became something with which he merely wished to "coquette".

In that case, Lenin should have said:

"It is possible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, merely by coquetting with the phraseology of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later anyone who is capable of coquetting will understand Marx!!" [Edited misquotation of Lenin (1961), p.180.]

This is from here: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm

The links and references I have used can be found on the above page.

[sameera]

Rosa

Could you please explain the difference between an equation with ordinary variables and differential equation according to your  studies.

sameera