Dialectics bites the dust

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to read my latest essay, just posted. Here is an edited taster:

Forces And Contradictions

DM-theorists frequently assert that "contradictions" (in nature or society) may be understood as the inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces condition one another, operating in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, as the case may be -- but only as revealed by careful scientific analysis. [Reference to Note 1 edited out here.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism]

Citations like those listed in Note 1 -- making the same point -- can be multiplied almost indefinitely. To be sure, such passages are often accompanied by extensive qualifications, depending on context, but the overall message is abundantly clear. Nevertheless, my concern here is not so much with whether these passages are consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been made to substantiate sweeping statements they contain with adequate evidence -- or any at all --, but with whether the idea that forces can model contradictions itself makes any sense.

Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical

As we shall see, the identification of forces with contradictions is highly dubious, at best. There are several obvious initial difficulties with the whole idea. For example, if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are hence 'contradictory' -- there would clearly have to be at least two forces present, operational and oppositional for that to be the case. But when we consider one of the most important and general types of motion found in the universe -- the orbital trajectory of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in classical Physics, at least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in question toward the centre of mass of the system. So, if classical Physics is correct, it is not easy to see how such forces could be viewed as 'contradictions'.

Even post-classical Physics offers little comfort for DM-theorists; here such motion is either a function of the topology of Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or it is the result of a body being situated in a tensor, vector and/or scalar field, in as many dimensions of phase space as are deemed necessary.

And this is not just true of gravity; as Max Jammer notes:

"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, has become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]

Even comrades Woods and Grant acknowledge this fact:

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]

Unfortunately, this means that most (if not all) of the motion in the universe cannot be accounted for by DM (if it is viewed as the result of 'contradictions' interpreted as opposing forces); if there is only one force here (or perhaps none at all), there can be no 'contradictions'. Hence, it would seem that DM can't explain most (if not all) of the motion found in nature.

This is, of course, just a snippet; the rest can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm

[Green]

Actually, gravity is one of the best canidates as an example for dialectics.

Lets take the Earth and the moon for example. While the Earth has a greater mass and keeps the moon in its orbit, the moon also pulls up on the Earth. This could be considered a contradiction, and you'll find that atoms interact with each other in the same way, they pull on each other. If the contradictions get too great, then negation of the negation would occur. If there was a black hole, and you flew a ship by it, the ship and the black hole would pull on each other, but the contradictions would be too great and the ship would be pulled into the black hole and the atoms would be torn apart.

This website looks crackpotish to me. I have no idea how the Romeo and Juliet quote is relevant to physics. I don't have time to read all that. It looks to be mostly based on a lack of understanding and assumptions. I also think that its biased based on the remarks it makes about "DM-Theorists" and dialectial materialism itself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Green, thanks for that, but it is clear that you have not read the Essay in question, or you have merely skim read it (of course there is no reason why you should read it all (but commenting on material you have not read is as unwise as it is foolish  :)), except I handle that obvious objection almost immediately):

While the Earth has a greater mass and keeps the moon in its orbit, the moon also pulls up on the Earth. This could be considered a contradiction, and you'll find that atoms interact with each other in the same way, they pull on each other.

The forces you refer to are both ones of attraction, and hence are not opposites (Engels and other dialecticians specifically talk of forces of attraction and repulsion when they model their 'contradictions', and there aren't any -- I give the quotes in Note 1), and they naturally combine to create a resultant force which is what causes the said motion (so if anything, we would have here a 'dialectical tautology', not 'contradition', if we want to anthropmorphise nature, and use such inappropriate terms -- which tactic I reject).

And, the said motion is caused by the earth on the moon: its motion is the result of one force.

This is what I say about that ('A' stands for 'attraction', and 'R' for 'repulsion'; so 'AA' refers, for example, to a force couple where there are two repulsive forces, and 'AA' for one where there are two of attraction'; 'UO' refers to 'Unity of Opposition':

Admittedly, this is a highly simplified picture, for even in such circumstances there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting in the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the orbiting body, motion is not the result of two different sorts of forces -- those of attraction and repulsion -- but the consequence of just one resultant force. In that case, orbital motion is produced by the action of one force only (in Classical Physics, that is).

Furthermore, any secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the system) which happens to be superimposed on the primary action only complicates this picture, it does not alter it. This extra activity might also be the result of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces (in Classical Physics, at least), which admittedly affect the said resultant; while they might change it, they do not turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic and these and several other options are examined again in more detail here. [Added here for this response to 'Green': This is a reference to a later section dealing with systems of forces, which 'he' clearly misssed.]

Even so, it is difficult to see how two attractive forces could be regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories'. Anyway, Engels himself argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion, despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in nature these seem to have little or no part to play. Not only that, the motion of, say, planet A around, say, star B, is caused by forces originating in B, not A. While, the forces originating in A may affect B, they do not affect A itself, or its motion around B.

It could be argued that the interconnected and reciprocal 'effect chain', as it were, in play between A and B shows that such forces are dialectically linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's own motion which must then affect A's and so on. But even here, the attractive forces do not confront each other as oppositional or as contradictory. At best, such forces affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any forces in play, and so on. In fact they appear to augment each other. On that basis, should we not (with more justification) say that such forces are, not contradictory, but tautologious? [On this see Note 38, below; which has this to say:

{Here we appear to have another ironic "dialectical inversion"; in this case, the said forces would not 'contradict', they'd augment, one another -- even though they are still not 'opposites'. Perhaps then we should call such ensembles "dialectical tautologies"?

On this basis, we might then be able to construct a whole (and wholly insincere) theory of universal harmony, using the fact that forces naturally combine to form resultants, which in turn 'encourage' motion and change. As a result of such an inversion -- putting DM back on its heels, as it were -- change could then be seen as an expression of cooperation, not conflict. And we could even re-introduce the idea of an 'imminent deity' (a suitable, but equally obscure analogue of the DM-'Totality') to give this novel theory the unity it needs, claiming all the while that these ideas have not been imposed on nature, merely read from it.

Since this 'theory' is based on a more realistic appraisal of the interplay between forces, who could object? We could even call this 'theory' "Deistic Materialism". Subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of course, be explained away, in classic DM-fashion (i.e., in the way that dialecticians do, they merely 'grasp' a contradiction in their own theory, but reject those in others). On the positive side, this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than does the average DM-thesis (given that resultant forces dominate all motion in reality).

Anyone critical of the above (wholly insincere and fictitiously) dotty 'theory', should also now take an equally sceptical view of the consistent (but less scientifically-accurate) dottiness of 'materialist dialectics'.}

And you fail to note that in relativity, there is no force of gravity; motion is the result of bodies moving along geodesics. So the moon moves along its worldline, in a scalar or tensor field, but not because of the result of a mythical 'contradiction' between forces. In short, the moon moves because spacetime is warped.

And the atom example you give is equally defective. Here you have forces of attraction only, once more. In magnetism and electricty, non-opposites attract, and opposites repel, so you do not have unified opposites attracting and repelling.

Again, this is what I say in that Essay:

Engels himself regarded the poles of a magnet as an example of the unity of AR-opposites in nature (something else he lifted from Hegel, and which has been parroted down the ages by countless uninventive DM-authors). [Cf., Engels (1954), p.72.]

The alleged 'unity' in this case appears to revolve around the fact that the north and south poles of a magnet cannot exist independently of each other, and their 'opposite' nature is shown by the effect they have on bodies and upon each other.

However, upon closer examination it is clear that the poles of a magnet are in fact examples of AA- or RR-, and not AR-opposites. This is because in this case it is non-opposites that repel each other (i.e., two norths or two souths; hence, like poles repel). On the other hand, opposites attract (i.e., a north and a south). Consequently, in the way that their poles inter-relate, magnets are in fact AA- or RR-forces. So, it now turns out that the magnet is far from being a paradigm example of an AR-force -- united in opposition --, as DM-lore would have us believe. Mysteriously, DM-theorists en masse have failed to notice this serious flaw in one of their key examples; so much for the claim that DM-theses have been read from -- but not projected onto -- the facts. [Incidentally, the same comments apply to electrical phenomena.]

It could be objected to this that, while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of an AA-force type, their continued motion toward one another will be prevented at some point by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and these forces would operate in an AR-manner. In that case, R-forces operating between approaching nuclei of the material from which the magnet is made would prevent opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that had brought them together. This therefore implies that the relation between the poles of a magnet is indeed that of an AR-couple -- or so an objector might claim.

But, this means that, as magnetic opposites, these poles would still not be AR-UO's. Sure other forces might come into play, but that does not affect that salient point.

Despite this, the above objection would reduce the oppositional relationship between the forces originating in these magnets to the effect that they had on motion (since these poles manifestly do not affect each other, only the relative motion of the matter in each pole). Hence, the two poles would not be inter-related directly to each other as opposite AR-forces; they would just oppose any motion that either or both of them had induced in the system. We have already had occasion to dismiss this view as inimical to DM.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

In which case, the inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even AR-couples, actually oppose or limit whatever motion is already present in the system -- or they restrict the freedom of bodies to move once set in motion. But, they still do not seem to oppose each other as force upon force. Again, this is probably one reason why Engels toyed with a positivistic re-interpretation of forces (in DN, as was pointed out above in Note 4), since no physical sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as noted earlier) -- over and above seeing this as an obscure way of depicting relative motion between bodies.

{This is what Note 4 contains:

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]}

Anyway, the nature of the UO here clearly depends on what is meant by the terms "opposite" and "unity". North and South poles are not united in the sense that they are one (as DM-theorists would be the first to point out), they are connected in the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal not logical; magnetic properties are the result of the vector configuration of the 'motion' and 'spin' of certain electrons. There is nothing in nature that logically forces this interrelation on these poles. Indeed, the idea that such a configuration represents a UO is empty, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a vector field. And, as we have already seen, it is not easy to see how vectors can be regarded as contradictions (or UO's).

Indeed, in ferromagnetic substances, the magnetic field is built up by the cooperative alignment of individual magnetic moments (perhaps illustrating the fundamentally cooperative nature of reality again, created by the 'dialectical tautologies' we met earlier(!)).

Certainly, given Engels's use of the term "force" (whether interpreted realistically, or positivistically as a "useful fiction"), this is a rather poor example of a UO, anyway; it is consequent upon a particular sort of mathematical analysis (i.e., it is based on the alignment of electrons, which orient the vector field that determines the direction of the magnetic field). Calling this a UO would be to substitute an obscure metaphor for a clear mathematical description for no extra explanatory gain.

[Of course, there is no UO here, since the field in question is the result of one sort of particle, the electron, which is a single charged elementary particle that is not itself a UO (it has no parts).]

So, that example can be crossed off the DM-list.

Then you raise this odd point (I would have thought it was clear what I was trying to say):

I have no idea how the Romeo and Juliet quote is relevant to physics.

That was a reference to the fact that this area of dialectics has to use language metaphorically (ie., when dialecticians employ such words as 'contradiction', which, as the word means, is 'to gainsyay' another human being, or sentence they had produced, something that only human beings do, since only they can say things) to try to account for forces. I raised the question that, if this is so: how can that account for anything physically? So just as the passage in question cannot physically account for Juliet's beauty, or its effect on Romeo, so the metaphorical use of this word (i.e., 'contradiction') cannot account for things either.

I don't have time to read all that. It looks to be mostly based on a lack of understanding and assumptions.

Which explains all the mistakes you have made, then.

And, since dialecticians show that they have not understood their own theory (hence all the contradictions in their own attempts to explain it, that I reveal in this and other Essays), if I do not understand things, then I am in good company. Which is why I ask for the theory to be explicated in clear terms for the first time in 120 years -- or abandoned.

And I suggest that if you are going to comment on what I have writtten, you read it first; otherwise you might like to keep your opinions to yourself.  :)

[turnoviseous]

I am not really an in-depth physics knower, and I havent read your whole essay, since I am very very much busy with other stuff, but I like the effort you put into this essay you wrote, but anyway, I look on it this way. I have no idea if its going to help you anyway getting to understand dialectics, how the opposites give a way to movement in universe etc., but this is how understand it regarding "subjectivity of forces" in dialectics, as you name it (something like that).

What I am going to say is probably all what you already know and have heard, but to make a point, I will write it a bit more abstract and as simple as possible, to get away from currently unnecessary cases. If I get something wrong, please correct me.

Workers want to put the bourgeois class out of power, true or not? It could be safely said both answers are correct, but determing them before they become inevitable is beyond the power of paper talk in this thread and even the best computer couldnt give an exact answer until it becomes inevitable. And determing the inevitability of this case is a science and an art of its own.

The fact is tho´, as Marx points out somewhere on numerous places, proletariat and bourgeois class are nothing but a relationship in which people are caught because of objective and subjective conditions. The first do one thing, the other do something else, because of the particular relationship, their interests contradict (these two groups of people dont just contradict each other for fun). This fact alone gives the possibility to change the relationship itself.

What about the vectors you are mentioning and how they do/dont contradict each other, about forces etc.?

What wants a planet achieve against the other object? To pull the other object to itself. The other wants to achieve the exact opposite thing, to pull the other one to itself!

The result is objectively the same (they are both together eventually), as you say in your essay, because here, with gravity and an object, we are dealing with an unfortunate situation, where an objects usually keeps similar mass compared against to the other object, and it doesnt change radically in favour of the other object in the process. If the mass of one object were to change radically in the process in favour of the other object the result would be different - what happens to Moon if Earths mass is to increase dramatically to basically eat the Moon, it is also going to be pretty different if the opposite happens and Moon gains on mass dramatically?

Isnt the same in the class war?


Maybe I just missed the point of your essay and you are talking about something else. I somehow dont see the point in what you want to say besides this.

I have to go and do some work now...

[Evan Roberts]

In physics, every force has an equal and opposite force, the sum total of momentum is zero. Motion between two bodies in orbit contains TWO forces, both a result of the gravitational attraction between the two bodies. All Forces act as pairs as every student is taught in physics lessons.

In circular motion, each mass spends half its time accelerating in the direction of x, and half its time accelerating in the opposite direction. The sum total of each masses acceleration in a complete orbit is zero, hence you can have a continuous, stable orbit without the need for repulsive forces to act in the opposite direction to the attractive ones.

The same can not be said of an atoms nucleus, where no orbits are involved, hence the repulsive electrical force of the protons is counteracted by the attractive one known as the "strong force"

Except for circular motion though, I can't think of another situation that can go on indefinitely where both attractive and repulsive forces don't both play a part. Correct me if I'm wrong.

In the universe as a whole, cosmologists have the problem that if Gravity is to strong, the universe will collapse, if it is too week, it will continually expand. Over time, if the universe is to go on forever, repulsive forces must play an equal role as attractive ones. A black hole must eventually result in a huge explossion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Evan, thanks for this:

In physics, every force has an equal and opposite force, the sum total of momentum is zero. Motion between two bodies in orbit contains TWO forces, both a result of the gravitational attraction between the two bodies. All Forces act as pairs as every student is taught in physics lessons.

But I have already covered this point.

[And, in  Relativity, there is no force of gravity; all you have is motion along a geodesic, in an energy/scalar field, along a world-line. No forces, no contradiction.]

In circular motion, each mass spends half its time accelerating in the direction of x, and half its time accelerating in the opposite direction. The sum total of each masses acceleration in a complete orbit is zero, hence you can have a continuous, stable orbit without the need for repulsive forces to act in the opposite direction to the attractive ones.

I agree, so I wasn't sure why you would want to argue this against me.

Thankyou for this as well:

The same can not be said of an atoms nucleus, where no orbits are involved, hence the repulsive electrical force of the protons is counteracted by the attractive one known as the "strong force"

I deal with this at my site.

Except for circular motion though, I can't think of another situation that can go on indefinitely where both attractive and repulsive forces don't both play a part. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Once more, and forgive me for saying this, I deal with this at my site.

The point is, even if you were right [but see below], there is no way that opposing forces can be read as contradictions.

A contradiction is, in ordinary language (as the word suggests -- 'contra' (against), 'diction' (saying)), a 'gainsaying' of something someone else has said. So unless nature can talk, there are none of these in nature.

And in logic, one proposition contradicts another if when the first is true the second is false, and vice versa (or: they cannot both be true and cannot both be false at once).

So, unless you think propositions exist in the universe, or forces actually argue among themselves, forces can contradict nothing at all.

[More details at my site.]

Finally, although you mention modern views of forces, you must know (as Engels himself anticipated) that Physicists actually regard these as an exchange of momentum -- so there are no real 'forces' in modern Physics (hence all those 'exchange' particles).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Turnoviseous , thankyou also for those thoughts.

I have no idea if its going to help you anyway getting to understand dialectics, how the opposites give a way to movement in universe etc., but this is how understand it regarding "subjectivity of forces" in dialectics, as you name it (something like that).

I could not really follow this (recall, I have been reading works on dialectics now for over 20 years (hundreds and hundreds of books and articles) -- and not a single one made any sense at all).

And recall also that I do not deny the class struggle, I just reject all this Hegelian mumbo jumbo that has been superimposed on historical materialism. We do not need it.

What wants a planet achieve against the other object? To pull the other object to itself. The other wants to achieve the exact opposite thing, to pull the other one to itself!

Well, you notice you have to impute human intentions to make this work.

Isnt the same in the class war?

No because human beings are involved in the class war, and planets cannot talk (hence they cannot contradcit one another).

[I deal with your other objection at my site, if I understood it aright. It seems your first language is not English, and this might be why you have misunderstood me.]

My Essays are rather long (the one in question is over 60, 000 words long!!).

I have published a much shorter summary of it here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-8.htm#Forces and Contradictions

I will be posting an 'absolute beginners' guide' to my ideas later in the summer.

[turnoviseous]

Hello Rosa,


I read Essay Eight Part Two: Conflicting View Of Forces, but not all of it. I think I got the main idea of this essay, but I cant be sure since I havent read it all. In any case, it seems you put quite some work into this, but I still dont agree with it, from what I have read.

I fail to see how the question whether nature can talk or not is relevant here. It definitely "talks", just not the way we talk to each other. In any case, from the sentance you quote me, if you put the word "want" away, then you surely dont have the human intentions behind it to make it work? Further, I still dont understand how the inability of planets to talk in a human sense prevents contradiction.

What I think is more important, is how this theory you have there is to impact the view on class struggle and revolution, I havent found any views on your website on that issue.

BTW Rosa, I am just interested, you say you have read a lot of works on dialectics, I dont doubt it.. have you read Ilyenkovs works on Dialectics, what do you think of it? I have this work in mind:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/index.htm

and especially  http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay10.htm (10: Contradiction as a Category of Dialectical Logic) If I got the idea of your theory right, this deals with your theory directly and argues against what you want to achieve with your theory....again, if I got the idea of your theory right.

and

http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay11.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Turnoviseous, thankyou once again for those thoughts:

I fail to see how the question whether nature can talk or not is relevant here.

There are two senses of the word 'contradiction': one from logic and one we use in ordinary language.

The first is tightly defined (and not as it is 'defined' in books and articles you might have read written by dialecticians) as follows: Two propositions are contradictory if and only if, when the first is true the second is false, and vice versa; they cannot both be true, and they cannot both be false. Anything else is not a contradiction in logic.

In ordinary language the word itself tells you what it means: "contra" = "against" and "dict" = "speak": or "to speak against", or better: "to gainsay".

Hence, in that Essay I address the question: which of these senses do dialecticians mean when they use forces to illustrate 'dialectical contradictions'? It can't be the first, since forces are not propositions, and no matter how you try to re-configure them they cannot be fitted into the definiton I gave above. [That is why I tried every way I could think of, of doing this at my site, in the full Essay, that is. That is why it is so long.]

It can't be the second because forces cannot talk.

So, they must mean it in another sense. So far they have failed to say what that is. I therefore contend that this term is devoid of meaning.

Further, I still dont understand how the inability of planets to talk in a human sense prevents contradiction.

Well then you must be using that word in a new and as yet unexplained sense. Until you say what this is, I suggest that you cannot mean anything by it. It is as empty a word as, say, 'god' is.

What I think is more important, is how this theory you have there is to impact the view on class struggle and revolution, I havent found any views on your website on that issue.

Correct, since I think Marx (and Lenin and Trotsky....) said all I want to say on this (if you remove the Hegelian clap trap, that is). I specifically say this in the opening pages.

have you read Ilyenkovs works on Dialectics, what do you think of it? I have this work in mind:

Yes, he is a very confused thinker, and he fails to say what these obscure terms mean, too.

[Evan Roberts]

Rosa, you state that in gravitational attraction only one force exists, therefore making it undialectical. But what you really mean is only one type of force exists, for in every case of gravitational attraction there exists a pair of forces, where each body acts upon the other. "For every action there is an equal and opposite action", yet you claim that these are not operation and oppositional forces present.

Motion cannot be isolated from its opposite pair, It is impossible to keep on getting closer to the sun for ever and ever, eventually you will crash into it or burn into ashes! The bourgeoisie cannot keep on acting to increase the level of profit from the worker without the proletariat also acting to decrease the surplus value of his labour. Economic protests and capitalist greed are a dialectical pair, they go together. As the saying goes; what goes up, must come down. Here we have the dialectic of positive and negative

Orbital motion has an inherent contradiction within it, In the period of a complete rotation, gravitational attraction pulls in all 360 degrees of space, for the sum of the magnitude of acceleration in the direction of x  is equal as the sum in the opposite direction. The average acceleration is zero.

 In a similar way, a football team could keep on heading with the ball towards the opponents goal indefinitely, if when the attacking team almost gets there, the two teams switch ends. In that event, despite the match being completely one sided, the ball hasn't moved any further in one direction than in the other. In orbits, the motion of planets keeps on "moving the goalposts" of gravitational attraction.

We could of course, get away from the changing, contradictory nature of gravitational attraction in orbits, by taking not an inertial reference point, but a rotating reference frame. This way, the gravitational attraction acts permanently in only the one direction. But as every rollercoaster fan or car driver knows, when you go round a bend you feel a centrifugal force, pushing you out. This is what is called the "false" centrifugal force. So in a rotating reference frame, the centripetal force is counteracted by the centrifugal one. As physicists say, it helps balance the books!

But it's fictitious, you might argue. But then, in general relativity, gravity becomes a fictitious force, also by introducing non inertial reference points. In orbits, where the gravitational attraction force is completely changing its direction, it makes sense to use a rotational reference point, which introduces new, so called "false" forces.

Rosa also makes the mistake of mixing up language, the communication of ideas, and reality:
"So, unless you think propositions exist in the universe, or forces actually argue among themselves, forces can contradict nothing at all." This is no better than saying an apple can't exist unless I speak of it. Contradictions, in dialectics as in everyday language, means opposing trends, tendencies, ideas, or forces. In sport for example, attack can't exist without defence.

Here's a dictionary definition for you:
contradiction: "opposition between two conflicting forces or ideas"

 Dialectics is the science of movement or change. I can not vouch for the correctness of everything Hegel says, much of which I find puzzling, but I am sure of the value of analysing objects as being in constant flux, where its parts are constantly interacting, and often contain contradicting forces between them, which expresses itself in the whole. Dialectics also contains other "laws" or patterns of motion, such as the law of quantity into quality, or the negation of the negation. As well as being simple to understand, these laws have proved incredibly useful in both the "hard" and "soft" sciences. The idea that dialectics is somehow "spiritual" or non materialistic, is a load of nonsense. As is the claim that no one understands it.

[turnoviseous]

Rosa,

you say

There are two senses of the word 'contradiction': one from logic and one we use in ordinary language.

The first is tightly defined (and not as it is 'defined' in books and articles you might have read written by dialecticians) as follows: Two propositions are contradictory if and only if, when the first is true the second is false, and vice versa; they cannot both be true, and they cannot both be false. Anything else is not a contradiction in logic.

In ordinary language the word itself tells you what it means: "contra" = "against" and "dict" = "speak": or "to speak against", or better: "to gainsay".

Furthermore, in discrete mathematics of logic, a term is contradictory when a term is always false, for all the possibilities of the basic statements which make up the term. Thats the logical definition of contradiction I know, it can probably be found in any book of formal logic or discrete mathematics (I have never heard the logical definition you point out). There is a lot of explanations of what a contradiction is, neither has anything to do with dialectics.

I think this essay from Ilyenkov http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay10.htm  deals exactly with what you are saying.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Turnoviseous:

Furthermore, in discrete mathematics of logic, a term is contradictory when a term is always false, for all the possibilities of the basic statements which make up the term.

I am aware of that, but since I do not regard the theorems of mathematical logic as truths, I do not subscribe to this view.

[I hasten to add that that does not mean I reject them, it is just that if we have to regard them as true or false, then those two words cannot mean the same as the typographically simiaar words (i.e., 'True', and 'False') we use in ordinary language.]

I have never heard the logical definition you point out.

Well, it is standard stuff in logic (perhaps not mathematical logic).

Thanks for the Ilyenkov link, but I have read this material, as I said, and it is hoplessly confused.

[turnoviseous]

Rosa,

I had formal logic and discrete mathematics classes on computer science university and I havent seen a contradiction explained the way you explained it. Surely this cant be the way formal logic determines a contradictory term/thing, what kind of logic are you refering to?


I went carefully over the chapters "A Contradictory Theory? 'Literal Forces' In Opposition" and "Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth -- Or Is It Too Few?"

Especially, your F29 to F36 is very confusing, to say the least.

F36: All this is independent of whatever an external cause (or causes) initiated these internal changes in FD or FS, if any did. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to Cornforth), external causes cannot bring about the internal qualitative changes required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be internally-generated in the last analysis.

I fail to see why external event could not help to bring the internal qualitative change. Isnt the fall of Roman slavery a perfect example to it? Furthermore, the possibility of the external factor to influence an internal change, to give it a push, does not demolish the idea that the contradiction is inside the thing and a precondition for a qualitative change.

And when you say

It looks like there is no way of rescuing this 'theory' along these lines. If a force prevents something happening it cannot contradict it; if prevented, it does not exist.55

On the other hand, if forces affect one another externally (as they seem to do), then change cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions'. Alternatively, if they have internal effects on one another, but they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions' then either they are composed of simple units that do not change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else internally, for there would be no such things.

and then in the note you say:

However, some may still object and claim that if a force prevents something coming into being, it must have contradicted it. Let us say, therefore, that if event  Ei at time t, is prevented from becoming   Ei' at t' by force P, then   Ei at will have been contradicted by P. Hence, it could be argued that in this sense it is clear that forces prevent the effects of other forces from being realised by contradicting certain events, stopping them from occurring.

But, even here, forces do not 'contradict' one another (as force on force), they merely affect the events 'controlled' by other forces. So this cannot help us understand how forces can be said to contradict each other.

Nevertheless, let us examine this objection in more detail, so that every possibility is catered for.

Consider an event set E consisting of sub-events E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force P not stopped things at the Ei stage, say. Had things carried on as 'normal', Ei would have led to Ei+1, but as things turned out, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented it. So, P contradicted Ei+1.

However, since Ei+1 never existed, it could not have been contradicted by P (unless forces can contradict non-existent things/processes, after all).

We thus hit the same brick wall.

Even if we try to argue that P contradicted Ei by stopping it producing Ei+1, this will do no good. This is because events are not like eggs which produce things; so they can hardly be prevented from producing other events if they don't produce them in the first place.

It could be objected here that this entire approach to 'events' and 'forces' atomises them, and puts them in rigid categories, compartmentalising reality. Dialectics, in comparison, sees the fluid unity of nature and its interactions in a totally different and contradictory light. Hence the above analyses are completely wrong-headed.

But, unless and until DM-apologists tell us what they intend -- or what, for example, the 'fluid' nature of reality is (or worse, what this odd metaphor could possibly mean)) --, then that objection is itself devoid of content (since it contains empty phrases). Anyway, this objection is neutralised here.

Once again, there is a simple solution here: dialecticians should tell us what, if anything, they mean by their odd use of (Hermetic) language.

When you say

It looks like there is no way of rescuing this 'theory' along these lines. If a force prevents something happening it cannot contradict it; if prevented, it does not exist.

and continued in the note....

What you are saying in fact is that if some event prevents (contradicts, as you say) another event from happening, the first could not have prevented (contradicted) it, since the last never happened. In fact, the problem I see here is that we are not doing with done events here, thus we dont need a finished event to start with, we dont need a finished successful socialist revolution to start fighting bourgeois class. We dont need Sun to eat a rocket for gravitiy to start working between the two objects. The conditions you create are events turned upside down.

and then you say

On the other hand, if forces affect one another externally (as they seem to do), then change cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions'. Alternatively, if they have internal effects on one another, but they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions' then either they are composed of simple units that do not change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else internally, for there would be no such things

I am puzzled, why is it so? Why there is no such thing and why should they be composed of unchangable units?


I havent finished the essay, but from what I see, the message from Ilyenkovs article is very much appropriate for your theory. Ilyenkov shows that solving uresolvable contradictions is not only impossible, but constructs even more contradictions along the way, so by recognizing and understanding them is the way of solving them, and "solving" them is to make more contradictions, which eventually make thing collapse. He shows this very well on the example of the theory of value.

[turnoviseous]

And when you say:

In order to investigate this model more closely, let us imagine that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57

F38: Let the first force be F1, and the second, F2.

F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.

F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.

F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0.

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.]

F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where no net force exists.

As noted earlier, we face immediate problems with this way of depicting forces -- difficulties encountered above in relation to the inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects -- such as forces represented by vectors.

Ignoring this too, it is worth noting again that F40 implies that there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only one force -- the resultant -- at work in the system. On this model, we see once again that F37 would collapse for want of forces. No contradiction seems possible if only one (resultant) force is at work in a system; still less if no force is present.

It could be objected here that in the above, both of the original forces (F1 and F2) still exist, since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in the system (as they do in F39 and F41).

The problem with this reply is that it is not easy to see how the two original forces may also be said to exist alongside a third force -- the resultant -- whether the latter is zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three forces in the system, not one, or two. This would, of course, create energy out of nowhere.58

Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third social force, the nature of which is to this day completely obscure. Since, on this model, all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this "third force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the utmost urgency.59

Moreover, on this view, forces are 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is triadic), but it would, in fact, sink the theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. This is because change would then be a result not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.

And, as we have seem already, it is just as easy to depict this set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to describe it as 'contradictory' -- even though both descriptors rightly belong in the mystical concept-crusher as hopelessly anthropomorphic.

Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with 'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When interpreted metaphorically it turns out to be inappropriate (if not paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally it crumbles into incoherence and inconsistency.

So, in order to avoid all these difficulties, we need to return to an option that was considered only briefly earlier -- one that might provide DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'. However, before this alternative is aired, it is necessary to counter an objection that should by now have occurred to the reader: this whole analysis is abstract and fails to consider "real material forces"

You miss the point when you say

"Moreover, on this view, forces are 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is triadic), but it would, in fact, sink the theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. This is because change would then be a result not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces."

First, I fail to see how you can have two contradictory forces without a resultant, furhermore, if resultant is understood as change, it is because of the 2 forces that combine into resultant, obviously, they dont create a resultant, they combine into it, and if they havent, there would be no resultant, obviously.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Turnoveiseous (thankyou yet again for the care you are showing):

I had formal logic and discrete mathematics classes on computer science university and I havent seen a contradiction explained the way you explained it. Surely this cant be the way formal logic determines a contradictory term/thing, what kind of logic are you refering to?

Standard, first-order classical logic. You need to remember that logic is handled differently in mathematics than it is in philosophy.

Check these:

http://ethics.acusd.edu/Courses/logic/powerpoint/contradiction/logical%2520contradiction,%2520identity,%2520and%2520compatibility/sld003.htm

http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/Logic/logiglos.html

And an extended discussion here:

http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:qwOgK66SXdAJ:www.leidenuniv.nl/philosophy/medewerkers/catarina/articles/paraconsistenttext.pdf+%22Contradiction%22+%2B+%22logic%22&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=45

I can post references to logic texts that define it this way, if you want.

I fail to see why external event could not help to bring the internal qualitative change. Isnt the fall of Roman slavery a perfect example to it? Furthermore, the possibility of the external factor to influence an internal change, to give it a push, does not demolish the idea that the contradiction is inside the thing and a precondition for a qualitative change.

I handle this objection in Part One of that Essay.

What you are saying in fact is that if some event prevents (contradicts, as you say) another event from happening, the first could not have prevented (contradicted) it, since the last never happened. In fact, the problem I see here is that we are not doing with done events here, thus we dont need a finished event to start with, we dont need a finished successful socialist revolution to start fighting bourgeois class. We dont need Sun to eat a rocket for gravitiy to start working between the two objects. The conditions you create are events turned upside down.

Well, if we are to talk successfully about such things, the language of traditional philosophy is hopeless (and it is even worse if we use the jargon inherited from Hegel). Hence I try to show that howsoever you try to slice things, traditional dialectical formulae will not work.

We have enough resources in ordinary material language that more than adequately cope with change -- including the sort you mention -- and without having to rope in these obscure Hegelian notions.

Now, I'd like to see you construct a contradiction out of the things you mention.

I have tried every way I can think of -- you are welcome to try to bring this 'theroy' back from the dead, if you can.

Granted social processes are long and drawn out, but if something is prevented, it never happened, and cannot form part of a contradicition.

Now you can re-define the word 'contradict' so that it means the same as 'prevent' (but as I show, it does not even work then), but that would be a subjective linguistic fix drafted in to help cure an ailing theory, and not reflective of reality. It would be a bit like someone re-defining their overdraft to mean 'I have $10 million' in the bank.

Or someone re-defining capitalism to mean 'fair to all...etc'.

I am puzzled, why is it so? Why there is no such thing and why should they be composed of unchangable units?

If you look at those comments, you will see I link to where I demonstrate this in Part One of the same essay.

It is based on a modern version of Kant's antinomy of matter (if you know of it).

I havent finished the essay, but from what I see, the message from Ilyenkovs article is very much appropriate for your theory. Ilyenkov shows that solving uresolvable contradictions is not only impossible, but constructs even more contradictions along the way, so by recognizing and understanding them is the way of solving them, and "solving" them is to make more contradictions, which eventually make thing collapse. He shows this very well on the example of the theory of value.

Well, you keep saying this, and so I shall have to just keep denying it.

Ilyenkov is a thoroughly confused thinker; far from helping, this article makes things worse.